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I. INTRODUCTION
U.S. judges, activists, and academics have theorized extensively about
how the struggle for African Americans' civil rights shapes U.S. law
prohibiting discrimination against other groups. ' Many worry that race
jurisprudence has made U.S. discrimination law overly preoccupied with
achieving formal equality and has blocked other important goals. 2 Some
feminists argue that analogies to race prevent discrimination law from
reaching the "substance of most lived sex inequality," such as low pay in
feminized professions and inadequate childcare provision. 3 Advocates for the
disabled are concerned that race analogies block group-based claims to
radically redesign workplaces.4 Gay rights activists argue that analogies to
race limit the law's focus to immutable traits. As a result, gays and lesbians
feel compelled to downplay their orientation, ethnic minorities have to mute
their accents, and women must hide their status as mothers.
5
Are race precedents in fact strong constraints that substantially limit
courts' discretion to address other groups' concerns? Or are analogies to race
"flexible tools" that advocates and judges can employ or reject depending on
their policy agendas? 6 To date, examining the U.S. historical record alone has
not offered a clear answer to these questions.
7
New comparative evidence permits us to examine how U.S. law might
have developed if race did not occupy this dominant position. For four
decades, sex discrimination in employment dominated the jurisprudence of the
European Court of Justice (ECJ), the highest court of the European Union.
1. See, e.g., JOHN D. SKRENTNY, THE MINORITY RIGHTS REVOLUTION 8-9 (2002) ("The Civil
Rights Act of 1964... created a tool kit or repertoire of policy models that could be extended again and
again and adapted to deal with the problems of groups other than black Americans."); Catharine A.
MacKinnon, Reflections on Sex Equality Under Law, 100 YALE L.J. 1281, 1289 (1991) (arguing that
"[t]he African American struggle for social equality" has "provided the deep structure, social resonance,
and primary referent for legal equality, however abstractly phrased").
2. See Reva B. Siegel, She The People: The Nineteenth Amendment, Sex Equality,
Federalism, and the Family, 115 HARV. L. REV. 948, 949 (2002) (arguing that constitutional sex
discrimination law focuses disproportionately on formal acts of classification because the U.S. Supreme
Court derived it from race discrimination law).
3. MacKinnon, supra note 1, at 1296.
4. See Michael Ashley Stein & Michael E. Waterstone, Disability, Disparate Impact, and
Class Actions, 56 DUKE L.J. 861, 863-66 (2006).
5. See Kenji Yoshino, Covering, Ill YALE L.J. 769, 779-80 (2002).
6. See Serena Mayeri, Reconstructing the Race-Sex Analogy, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1789,
1812 (2008) (arguing that Ruth Bader Ginsburg and her allies used the race-sex analogy as a "flexible
tool" to pursue "structural changes to the workplace and to the distribution of caretaking and wage-
earning responsibilities within the family"); see also William N. Eskridge, Jr., Some Effects of Identity-
Based Social Movements on Constitutional Law in the Twentieth Century, 100 MICH. L. REV. 2062,
2064 (2002) ("Precedent and common law reasoning were the mechanisms by which changes occurred
rather than their driving force.").
7. Moreover, advocates for alternatives to the current U.S. equality model have constructed
them in theoretically abstract terms. See, e.g., Robert C. Post, Prejudicial Appearances: The Logic of
American Antidiscrimination Law, in PREJUDICIAL APPEARANCES: THE LOGIC OF AMERICAN
ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW 1, 40-41 (Robert Post et al. eds., 2001) (rejecting the dominant color
blindness paradigm and proposing instead that "a sociological account" be developed, without
"attempt[ing] to argue for any particular set of principles that ought to guide the application of
antidiscrimination law"); Yoshino, supra note 5, at 783, 937 (critiquing "a formalistic regime of race-
blindness, sex-blindness, and orientation-blindness" but leaving open "the real question ... of how to
determine which traits will 'count' as traits that ought to be protected" in his alternative model
(emphasis omitted)).
Path Dependence in Discrimination Law
The Treaty of Amsterdam expanded the ECJ's jurisdiction, and the Court
decided its first race, disability, age and sexual orientation cases between 2006
and 2009.8
This Article argues that the sequence in which courts adjudicate claims
is an important determinant of the doctrines they develop. Because early
claims involved race in the United States and sex in the European Union, the
doctrinal architectures of the two jurisdictions diverged. Race-blindness, the
belief that no socially relevant attributes are intrinsically connected to race,
shaped U.S. courts' answers to key doctrinal questions. In contrast, sex-
consciousness guided EU courts' answers to the same questions. Sex-
consciousness is the belief that sex and certain socially relevant attributes are
intrinsically connected and worthy of protection under a nondiscrimination
framework. Doctrinal choices made in early race and sex cases were
subsequently extended to claims brought by other groups through analogical
reasoning and linguistic conventions calling for similar interpretations of the
same words in different contexts. Early doctrinal choices based on particular
understandings of race and sex predict the success (or failure) of current
national origin, age, disability, and sexual orientation claims.
Two separate theories, disparate treatment and disparate impact, have
been available to employees alleging discrimination in both the United States
and the European Union. Disparate treatment theory challenges intentional
discrimination. Disparate impact theory challenges employer practices that
appear neutral, but have the effect of harming minority groups. The EU analog
to disparate treatment is direct discrimination, and the EU analog to disparate
impact is indirect discrimination. I use the U.S. terms throughout for clarity,
and highlight where the doctrines diverge in the two jurisdictions.
The concept of path dependence helps explain the evolution of
employment discrimination doctrine in the United States and the European
Union. In path-dependent processes, choices made during critical junctures
are reinforced, rather than corrected, and this positive feedback loop results in
momentous consequences much later in time. Critical junctures are short
intervals during which powerful actors face an unusually broad range of
options. 9 Judges' ideologies, legislators' preferences, and social movements'
efforts have their greatest influence on doctrinal development during critical
junctures.
U.S. and EU courts encountered two separate critical junctures in
adjudicating employment discrimination claims. At the first critical juncture,
plaintiffs questioned what evidence was necessary to prove disparate impact.
The test in the two jurisdictions appears very similar: to make out a prima
facie case, plaintiffs must show that an employer practice has detrimental
effects on a protected group. However, courts interpreted this test differently.
8. Treaty of Amsterdam Amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties Establishing
the European Communities and Certain Related Acts art. 13, Oct. 2, 1997, 1997 O.J. (C 340) I. Article
13 of the Amsterdam Treaty allows for EU measures to combat discrimination on the grounds of sex,
racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation. Earlier treaties only called
for measures aiming to achieve equality between men and women.
9. See Giovanni Capoccia & R. Daniel Kelemen, The Study of Critical Junctures: Theory,
Narrative, and Counterfactuals in Historical Institutionalism, 59 WORLD POL. 341, 343 (2007).
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The U.S. Supreme Court insisted that plaintiffs must identify with substantial
specificity the causal link between the employer practice and the harmful
effect.10 In contrast, the ECJ effectively held that statistics alone sufficed to
establish disparate impact.11 Race-blindness and sex-consciousness influenced
these answers. Faced with a statistical disparity, a sex-conscious court can use
its own implicit theories about protected differences between men and women
to interpret the statistics. In contrast, a race-blind court sees no connection
between race and any socially relevant trait. It can therefore attribute racial
disparities to a "myriad of innocent causes," 12 and require the plaintiff to
supply a detailed theory of causation.
The U.S. requirement that plaintiffs specifically identify the causal
connection between an employer practice and the observed harm, and the
requirement's absence in EU law, has had dramatic consequences for groups
bringing subsequent claims. Because sex, age, and disability often correlate
with important features of the workplace environment, EU plaintiffs can
challenge practices that U.S. courts shield from scrutiny, including rigid
attendance requirements, limited opportunities for part-time work, and
segregated bargaining structures. EU law even allows plaintiffs to challenge
employer practices that have not yet harmed anyone, based on theories about
how particular employment practices have foreseeable differential
consequences for protected groups.
1 3
Race-blindness and sex-consciousness also shaped doctrinal choices at a
second critical juncture. Courts were faced with classifications based not on a
protected status as such, but on traits closely and causally linked to a protected
status. In both the United States and Europe, courts were first asked to
consider the links between sex and pregnancy. If sex discrimination is
prohibited, does this also make classifications based on pregnancy facially
discriminatory? Influenced by race-blindness, the U.S. Supreme Court
initially answered no, pointing to the fact that many women are not pregnant.
Therefore, plaintiffs were required to use disparate impact theory to challenge
pregnancy classifications, a doctrine that made plaintiff success less likely.
14
Influenced by sex-consciousness, the ECJ held that, since only women could
get pregnant, pregnancy classifications were not facially neutral, but
10. Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989). The comparative perspective
highlights some key assumptions liberals and conservatives shared on the specific practice requirement
which help explain why a form of this requirement persists in the 1991 Civil Rights Act. See infra
Subsection III.B. I.
1I. Case C-127/92, Enderby v. Frenchay Health Auth., 1993 E.C.R. 1-5535.
12. Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 657.
13. See Council Directive 2000/78, 2000 O.J. (L 303) 16 (EC). Article 2(2)(b) allows
plaintiffs to challenge "an apparently neutral provision, criterion or practice [that] would put persons
having a particular religion or belief, a particular disability, a particular age, or a particular sexual
orientation at a particular disadvantage." Id. art. 2(2)(b), at 18 (emphasis added); see also Council
Directive 2000/43, art. 2(2)(b), 2000 O.J. (L 180) 22, 24 (EC) (setting forth the same definition for
discrimination on the basis of "racial or ethnic origin"). EU directives are legal instruments that bind
member states to reach shared goals in a particular time frame, but permit some flexibility in the specific
means states choose. For a more extensive discussion of EU social policy directives, see Katerina Linos,
How Can International Organizations Shape National Welfare States?: Evidence from Compliance with
European Union Directives, 40 COMP. POL. STUD. 547 (2007).
14. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
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amounted to disparate treatment. 15 In the United States, Congress intervened
and amended Title VII to protect pregnant workers. Thus, even though
pregnancy claims have become covered, the doctrinal distinction between
disparate impact and disparate treatment was reinforced in the United States
while it became blurred in the European Union.
These early doctrinal choices shape current controversies about how far
discrimination law should extend to protect immigrants and same-sex couples.
If discrimination on the grounds of national origin is prohibited, are
classifications on the grounds of citizenship also facially discriminatory?
Similarly, where discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation is illegal,
is the differential treatment of married and unmarried couples facially
discriminatory? In the United States, the answer is usually no, because courts
treat almost every trait that is not exactly coterminous with a protected status
as facially neutral, and apply the disparate impact framework. In contrast, in
2008 the ECJ held that citizenship is closely and causally connected to
national origin. In the same year, the ECJ also emphasized that, since only
same sex-couples are prohibited from marrying, restricting spousal benefits to
married couples is facially discriminatory. The plaintiffs won in both of these
cases, in large part because the ECJ adjudicated them under the disparate
treatment framework.
In the United States, the distinction between disparate treatment and
disparate impact is a solid one, accepted by liberals and conservatives alike.
16
By contrast, the ECJ often assumes that practices implicating pregnancy,
marriage, or citizenship have predictable differential consequences on women,
same-sex couples, and ethnic minorities. The ECJ opinions also reflect a
moral judgment that employers who put these practices in place with the
intent of harming a subset of employees may not be very different from
employers who merely disregard their foreseeable consequences. 
17
However, the conflation of disparate impact and disparate treatment
does not systematically favor plaintiffs. In both the United States and the
European Union, a limited number of narrow defenses was available initially
in disparate treatment cases, while a much broader set of defenses was
available in disparate impact cases. In the European Union, the very decisions
that conflated the two doctrines allowed for broad defenses formerly confined
15. Case C-177/88, Dekker v. Stichting Vormingscentrum voor Jong Volwassenen (VJV-
Centrum) Plus, 1990 E.C.R. 1-3941, 1-3973.
16. For example, a unanimous Supreme Court recently held that a plaintiff who did not
carefully distinguish between disparate impact and disparate treatment theories early in the proceedings,
but alleged discrimination generally, could not later introduce disparate impact arguments. Raytheon Co.
v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44, 53 (2003); see also Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2674 (2009)
(suggesting that disparate impact theory and disparate treatment theory are independent theories, which,
in rare cases, may even impose conflicting duties on an employer).
17. Two leading antidiscrimination scholars, Robert Post and Barbara Flagg, hint at the
possibility of connections between impact and treatment doctrines. See Barbara J. Flagg, "Was Blind but
Now I See": White Race Consciousness and the Requirement of Discriminatory Intent, 91 MICH. L. REv.
953, 960 (1991) ("1 conclude with the speculation that [the requirement of discriminatory intent] owes
its longevity, at least in part, to its conformity with distinctively white ways of thinking about race
discrimination."); Robert Post, Prejudicial Appearances: The Logic of American Antidiscrimination
Law, 88 CAL. L. REv. 1, 39 (2000) ("1 strongly suspect that the insights of the sociological account
would soften this sharp and consequential distinction between facially neutral laws and laws that employ
explicit racial and gender classifications.").
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to disparate impact to be introduced in disparate treatment jurisprudence.
Soon after declaring that pregnancy discrimination could be understood as
disparate treatment on the grounds of sex, the ECJ suggested that it could
nonetheless be justified in some circumstances. In 2008 and 2009, the ECJ
extended these broad justifications to disparate treatment to claims of age and
disability discrimination, in ways that U.S. courts categorically reject.
To ascertain the relative contributions of politics, culture and precedent
to important instances of doctrinal development, this Article introduces new
EU cases and revisits key U.S. debates. I limit my analysis to workplace
discrimination cases because the ECJ's jurisprudence has been similarly
focused. Differences and similarities in Americans' and Europeans' attitudes
toward minorities and women, and in court structure and composition, offer
new data points from which to evaluate conventional wisdom. Traditional
accounts emphasize ideological differences as key drivers of the evolution of
U.S. discrimination law. The comparative perspective illustrates that majority
and dissenting Supreme Court Justices, as well as liberal and conservative
political leaders, often share fundamental assumptions, even in highly
politicized cases. Comparative analysis helps identify the historic moments
when politics, ideology, and culture mattered most, and helps specify the
mechanisms through which doctrinal choices made at early critical junctures
were replicated when courts addressed new groups' claims later on.
In addition, comparative analysis changes our calculations about the
costs and benefits of the race-blindness paradigm for groups bringing
subsequent claims. Departing from race-blindness does not systematically
favor plaintiffs, as U.S. activists often hope. When courts allow plaintiffs to
invoke differences, the risk that courts will give defendants similar options
increases dramatically. In the European Union, individuals who make claims
that courts consider typical of the protected category in which they belong
gain greater protection than in the United States. For example, women seeking
employment in heavily feminized professions, women seeking expansive
childcare-related accommodations, or physically disabled persons seeking
sheltered employment benefit more from EU law. In contrast, women seeking
employment in male-dominated fields, men planning to prioritize childcare,
older persons seeking to work past traditional retirement ages, and physically
disabled persons seeking physically demanding jobs, are all advantaged under
U.S. law.
II. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
Path-dependence claims are relevant to diverse legal arguments.
However, while allusions to path dependence are plentiful, careful
explanations of path-dependence mechanisms are scarce. This Part has three
aims: to explain the mechanisms of path dependence in judicial
decisionmaking, to discuss empirical methods appropriate for studying path-
dependent processes, and to develop testable implications of path dependence
and alternative theories.
Path-dependence theories are not merely arguments that history matters.
In many arguments about the influence of past events on the present, we
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assume proportionality in cause-effect relationships. For example, if we
observe that a law redistributes resources toward a certain group, we might
look to history for the moment in time when this group gained great political
power and enacted the law in its favor.
In contrast, research on path-dependent processes allows for the
possibility that small shifts made at critical junctures can have major
consequences that are difficult to reverse.'
8
What mechanisms generate self-reinforcing processes in judicial
decisionmaking? Scholars have thoroughly explored path dependence
mechanisms in economic markets and political processes. In addition, scholars
of the judiciary have emphasized the doctrine of precedent, which
undoubtedly constitutes a key aspect of any theory of path dependence in
courts. This doctrine requires that lower courts follow higher courts' guidance
and can thus explain some stability in judicial decisions. 19 Even in
jurisdictions with no strict precedent doctrine, the influence of higher courts'
rulings on lower courts is significant. And many courts are bound to follow
their own prior decisions. More generally, any doctrine that calls for
predictability in legal outcomes can slow reform: such doctrines are
fundamental to the concept of the rule of law and are found across legal
systems.
21
However, arguments about precedents and predictability leave two open
questions. First, why do courts not only keep doctrines stable over time, but
also expand these doctrines by applying them to new issue areas? To answer
this question, the discussion below emphasizes the use of specific
interpretation techniques, notably analogical reasoning and conventions
calling for the interpretation of the same words in the same way in different
contexts.
Second, when path dependent processes lead to poor outcomes, why are
they not interrupted? This Article suggests that a key difference between path
dependence in courts, markets and legislatures is the existence of correctives.
Both economic and political markets contain mechanisms to interrupt path-
dependent processes; such mechanisms are much more limited in judicial
systems. While path dependence can lead businesses to sell outdated
technologies, markets are often structured so as to create incentives for
competitors to emerge. While path dependence can lead political processes
astray, elections allow for the interruption of self-reinforcing cycles. Instead,
courts are typically insulated from analogous correctives. Even in the rare
cases when other branches of governments intervene to reverse judicial
decisions, the discussion below suggests that important aspects of these
decisions can persist.
18. See generally Paul Pierson, Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of
Politics, 94 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 251 (2000).
19. See Oona A. Hathaway, Path Dependence in the Law: The Course and Pattern of Legal
Change in a Common Law System, 86 IOWA L. REv. 601, 622 (2001).
20. See Amy E. Sloan, The Dog That Didn't Bark Stealth Procedures and the Erosion of
Stare Decisis in the Federal Courts ofAppeals, 78 FORDHAM L. REv. 713, 717-18 (2009).
21. See Julie C. Suk, Procedural Path Dependence: Discrimination and the Civil-Criminal
Divide, 85 WASH. U. L. REv. 1315, 1324 (2008).
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A. Path Dependence in Markets, Legislatures, and Courts
Different mechanisms generate self-reinforcing cycles in markets,
legislatures, and courts. Economists have puzzled over the continuous use of
the QWERTY keyboard, 22 the prevalence of North-North intra-industry
23 24trade,2 3 and the persistence of economic growth or stagnation. To explain
these puzzles, they have identified particular dynamics that give rise to path
dependence in markets: large set-up or fixed costs that benefit first-comers;
learning effects, as products introduced early become familiar and cheap to
produce over time; coordination effects, which arise when more actors take
similar actions; and self-reinforcing expectations, where market prevalence
enhances beliefs of further prevalence .
Path-dependence arguments are more central in politics, and explain the
persistence and expansion of both institutions 26 and particular policies. 27 In
politics, the central role of collective action presents strong barriers to change,
as the costs of change are often concentrated and the benefits diffuse.
28
Moreover, politics can be used to reinforce power asymmetries, such that the
actors who benefit from the current set of political arrangements are in a
strong position to sustain them.29 Path dependence in political processes is
likely to shape key legal outcomes that result from legislative and executive
decisions. For example, scholars of corporate and business laws emphasize
that these laws create political incumbents, who in turn use their influence to
preserve their economic advantages and stifle change.
30
However, different mechanisms generate path dependence when policies
are made through judicial interpretation, as is the case in the development of
discrimination law. Existing research on path dependence in courts
emphasizes factors that promote stability and slow down change. Precedent
and other doctrines requiring predictability in judicial decisionmaking
certainly contribute to stability. 31 Structural features of judicial systems also
help explain the slow pace of legal reforms. For example, individual litigants
typically only enjoy a small fraction of the benefits of new legal
interpretations, and the hierarchical nature of judicial systems raises the costs
22. See Paul A. David, Clio and the Economics of QWERTY, 75 AM. ECON. REv. 332 (1985).
23. See PAUL KRUGMAN, GEOGRAPHY AND TRADE (1991).
24. See generally DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE (1990).
25. See W. BRIAN ARTHUR, INCREASING RETURNS AND PATH DEPENDENCE IN THE ECONOMY
112(1994).
26. See, e.g., Seymour Martin Lipset & Stein Rokkan, Cleavage Structures, Party Systems and
Voter Alignments: An Introduction, in PARTY SYSTEMS AND VOTER ALIGNMENTS I (Seymour Martin
Lipset & Stein Rokkan eds., 1967) (explaining the persistence of political party cleavages over many
decades).
27. See, e.g., Paul Pierson, When Effect Becomes Cause: Policy Feedback and Political
Change, 45 WORLD POL. 595, 600-01 (1993) (explaining how the structure of policies benefiting the
elderly, notably Medicare, created strong incentives for the elderly to join the American Association of
Retired People, which, newly strengthened, could lobby for additional benefits for the elderly).
28. See Pierson, supra note 18, at 257-61.
29. Id.
30. See Mark J. Roe, Chaos and Evolution in Law and Economics, 109 HARV. L. REv. 641,
652 (1996).
31. See Hathaway, supra note 19, at 622; Suk, supra note 21, at 1324.
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of litigation, since many appeals are typically required to achieve law reforms
through courts.
32
However, two key puzzles remain. First, why are path-breaking court
decisions not only preserved, but often reinforced? Second, why are self-
reinforcing cycles not interrupted? Particular techniques of legal
interpretation, rather than structural features of judicial decisionmaking, help
answer the first question. These techniques influence whether a new decision,
a deviation from prior doctrine, will be extended into new domains and
expanded further. Only some judicial interpretation techniques generate self-
reinforcing cycles. For example, deductive reasoning might not work in this
way. When faced with a new case, a judge that deduces decisions from theory,
be it originalism or social welfare maximization, should not care about the
outcome of prior cases. If prior cases erroneously applied the theory, such a
judge will correctly apply the theory and reach a different outcome.
In contrast, reasoning by analogy, "the most familiar form of legal
reasoning," 33 can lead to positive feedback cycles because analogies allow a
deviation to be extended into many new situations. However, analogical
reasoning has substantial fluidity and flexibility. Therefore, while it is often
used in ways that expand on prior doctrines, it is sometimes used to cabin
existing decisions.
Most surprisingly, the method of interpretation that generated doctrinal
expansion in the employment discrimination decisions described below, was,
in a large part, textualism. Policy concerns related to race and a judicial
philosophy of race blindness motivated the Supreme Court to introduce
particular doctrines in race cases. Policy concerns related to sex and sex-
consciousness motivated the ECJ to make particular doctrinal choices in sex
cases. These concerns about paradigmatic categories help explain the
outcomes of critical junctures. Canons of interpretation stating that the same
words should be interpreted in the same manner were used to extend these
policy choices to new contexts where statutory language involved similar
phrasing.
34
Second, what happens when these interpretation techniques lead to
problematic outcomes, or to policies that displease powerful actors? Why are
path dependent processes not interrupted? While markets, and to a lesser
extent politics, contain correctives for path-dependent processes, correctives
are substantially weaker in judicial systems. In an economic market, when a
path-dependent process results in the spread of a low-quality good, incentives
exist for competitors to develop a better product, and institutional
arrangements, such as credit markets and patents, facilitate this.35 In politics,
elections are the mechanism that constrains governments from deviating too
32. See Frederick Schauer, Do Cases Make Bad Law?, 73 U. CHI. L. REv. 883, 909-11 (2006).
33. Cass R. Sunstein, Commentary, On Analogical Reasoning, 106 HARV. L. REv. 741, 741
(1993).
34. See Earl M. Maltz, The Legacy ofGriggs v. Duke Power Co.: A Case Study in the Impact
of a Modernist Statutory Precedent, 1994 UTAH L. REv. 1353, 1354-58 (developing an argument about
linguistic conventions to explain how the disparate impact doctrine was extended from race to sex in the
United States).
35. See Stan J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, Path Dependence, Lock-In, and History, II
J.L. ECON. & ORG. 205 (1995).
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far from popular preferences. In contrast, judicial decisionmaking is
intentionally structured to be insulated; for example, unlike politicians who
must constantly worry about losing popular support, judges often have life
tenure. Even when legislatures intervene to reverse judicial decisions, the
analysis below suggests that important aspects of court doctrines persist.
Isolating judicial decisionmaking from popular pressures may have many
benefits, but path-dependent doctrinal evolution could be counted among its
costs.
B. Examining Path-Dependent Processes Empirically
A central challenge in the path-dependence literature is testing claims
about path dependence against alternative explanations. 36 Comparative
analysis can be very useful to develop plausible counterfactuals about the
consequences of paths not taken. 7  This Article examines doctrinal
developments in the European Union and the United States, two jurisdictions
that differ on the key independent variable but are otherwise good matches.
Multiple testable implications follow, concerning expected variation across
jurisdictions, doctrines and protected groups.
The design of this study begins with a "controlled comparison." Ideally,
a controlled comparison involves "the study of two or more instances of a
well-specified phenomenon that resemble each other in every respect but
one." 38 EU and U.S. courts differ in one key respect, the consequences of
which are the object of this study: U.S. courts began with the race paradigm,
while EU courts began with the sex paradigm at historical moments when
particular interpretations of race and sex were dominant. The fact that EU law
began with sex discrimination law is in many ways accidental. The sex
antidiscrimination mandate in the 1957 Treaty of Rome establishing the
European Community was a last-minute addition meant to limit barriers to
trade and was understood as insignificant at the time.39 This accident casts
36. For a similar assessment of the key challenges facing the related literature on precedential
cascades, see Eric Talley, Precedential Cascades: An Appraisal, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 87 (1999). "My
conclusions [regarding possible empirical verification techniques] are perhaps the most skeptical. For
even ifprecedential cascades seemed plausible on a priori grounds, it is difficult and likely impossible to
test for their existence against any number of plausible alternative hypotheses." Id. at 93. The literature
on precedential cascades seeks to explain why rational judges might mimic each others' decisions, even
when they should know better. Such cascades result when the amount of public information, gleaned
from the choices of prior decisionmakers, overwhelms any private information, and actors all make the
same choice, following the public information and disregarding private cues. See Abhijit V. Banerjee, A
Simple Model of Herd Behavior, 107 Q.J. ECON. 797, 798 (1992); Sushil Bikhchandani et al., Learning
from the Behavior of Others: Conformity, Fads, and Informational Cascades, J. ECON. PERSP., Summer
1998, at 151, 154.
37. See Julie C. Suk, Equal by Comparison: Unsettling Assumptions of Antidiscrimination
Law, 55 AM. J. COMP. L. 295, 297-98 (2007); see also Daniela Caruso, Limits of the Classic Method:
Positive Action in the European Union After the New Equality Directives, 44 HARV. INT'L L.J. 331
(2003).
38. ALEXANDER L. GEORGE & ANDREW BENNETr, CASE STUDIES AND THEORY DEVELOPMENT
IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 151 (2005); see also Arend Lijphart, The Comparable-Cases Strategy in
Comparative Research, 8 COMP. POL. STUD. 158 (1975).
39. In 1957, the Treaty of Rome established the European Economic Community to liberalize
trade. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. II (entered
into force Jan. 1, 1958). French bureaucrats inserted a narrow equal pay clause in this treaty, at a time
when the ECJ was expected to hear a small number of trade disputes between EU governments, and to
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doubt on possible alternative theories: for example, the ECJ did not begin with
sex discrimination cases because the European public in the 1950s had
stronger feminist concerns than the U.S. public.
Developing perfectly controlled comparisons of U.S. and foreign legal
developments, or any historical event, is impossible.40 That said, a comparison
of EU and U.S. employment discrimination case law approaches this ideal. As
described below, EU and U.S. courts, societies, and political systems are
strikingly similar in some respects. They differ in other respects, but their
differences do not help explain the divergence in U.S. and EU anti-
discrimination doctrine. Moreover, EU and U.S. courts begin with exactly the
same doctrine; explicit borrowing leads directly to this identical starting point.
Nevertheless, controlled comparisons involving historical case studies are by
necessity imperfect. Two methods, within-case comparisons and process-
tracing, can complement these comparisons. Whereas quantitative studies
often use variation across cases to test their theories, qualitative research
typically proceeds by multiplying the testable implications of particular
theories by looking within particular cases. 4 1 For example, a quantitative
researcher might examine the hypothesis that race-blind precedents lead to the
rejection of pregnancy accommodation claims by studying antidiscrimination
law in many countries of the world and comparing how countries with race-
blind precedents and countries with sex-conscious precedents differ on
pregnancy accommodation. Instead, a qualitative researcher might look more
closely within particular countries and use variation across protected groups
and doctrines to test the same hypothesis. More specifically, if race-blind
precedents limit pregnancy accommodations, one could hypothesize that they
might also limit accommodations for older workers and disabled workers. Or,
one could hypothesize that race-blind precedents might limit both plaintiffs'
and defendants' arguments in similar ways. As with statistical cross-case
comparison, one evaluates how congruent observable outcomes are with the
tested hypothesis, as compared to how congruent these outcomes are with
alternative hypotheses.
Process-tracing is a "method [that] attempts to identif the intervening
causal process-the causal chain and causal mechanism."' 2 Process-tracing
emphasizes mechanisms, rather than ultimate effects. "[W]hen X causes Y it
may operate so as to leave a 'signature,"' and thus one may be able to use
historical evidence not only to observe whether Y occurred, but also to look
for traces of this signature.4 3 Written judicial opinions reveal a large amount
have no jurisdiction over claims concerning individual rights. Only in the 1970s did individuals think it
possible to challenge sex discrimination before the ECJ, after radical procedural and doctrinal
developments had occurred. For a historical account of how key doctrines creating the modem European
legal order were developed and accepted, see KAREN J. ALTER, ESTABLISHING THE SUPREMACY OF
EUROPEAN LAW: THE MAKING OF AN INTERNATIONAL RULE OF LAW IN EUROPE (2001).
40. See GARY KING, ROBERT 0. KEOHANE & SIDNEY VERBA, DESIGNING SOCIAL INQUIRY:
SCIENTIFIC INFERENCE IN QUALITATIVE RESEARCH 79-80 (1994) (describing "the fundamental problem
of causal inference").
41. See David Collier, The Comparative Method, in 2 POLITICAL SCIENCE: THE STATE OF THE
DISCIPLINE 105, 110-12 (Ada W. Finifter ed., 1993).
42. GEORGE & BENNETT, supra note 38, at 206.
43. Lawrence B. Mohr, The Reliability of the Case Study as a Source of Information, in 2
ADVANCES IN INFORMATION PROCESSING IN ORGANIZATIONS 82-83 (R.F. Coulam & R.A. Smith eds.,
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of information in addition to information about the ultimate outcome of the
case; one can therefore use them to look for signatures of causal connections
between cases. For example, to claim that a connection with a race precedent
caused a particular outcome in a sex discrimination case, one might examine
whether the race precedent is cited and whether the judge argues that he is
applying the cited precedent to new facts. However, because judges might
write opinions in order to persuade, rather than in order to explain their
thought processes, we might not always find so transparent a citation trail.
Conversely, an analogy to a prior case could serve to conceal impermissible
reasoning-such as reasoning on the basis of a judge's personal preferences.
As with evidence concerning outcomes, the strongest evidence comes when
the causal signature is distinctive and inconsistent with other plausible
alternative theories. For example, in a case evaluating the legality of
mandatory retirement, the ECJ drew analogies from sex precedents to
conclude that it had jurisdiction over such arrangements. 4 While this
constitutes evidence that sex precedents shaped the Court's thinking, even
stronger evidence comes from the Advocate General's position.45 He argued
that the Court should reach a different conclusion-that the age discrimination
directive should be read to exclude mandatory retirement from ECJ scrutiny-
but conceded that sex precedents point in the opposite direction. 46 Close
reading of important cases in Parts III and IV below employ these methods.
C. EU and U.S. Doctrine in Context
U.S. and EU courts reach their decisions in particular times and places.
Scholars must therefore disentangle the influence of prior case law, from the
influence of contemporary cultural, political, and ideological pressures. This
Section introduces some general background about the context in which
employment discrimination doctrine developed in the two jurisdictions. Parts
III and IV below explore in greater detail how these factors influenced
particular cases. A pattern emerges: it is very difficult to use broad theories of
cultural, political, or institutional differences to explain the main differences
between U.S. and EU employment discrimination doctrine. However, we can
use path-dependence frameworks to understand when culture, ideology, and
institutional structure have mattered most, and when their influence has been
more limited.
Citizens' attitudes toward particular minority groups likely influence
antidiscrimination doctrine to some extent. If Europeans and Americans had
very different attitudes about racial minorities, women or immigrants, these
different attitudes could lead the two jurisdictions' doctrines to diverge.
1985).
44. See Case C-411/05, Palacios de la Villa v. Cortefiel Servicios SA, 2007 E.C.R. 1-8531,
which is discussed below in Subsection IV.C.2.
45. The judges of the ECJ are assisted by eight Advocates General, who are responsible for
developing written opinions on how controversies before the Court should be resolved. Advocate
General opinions are not binding, but are typically followed. For a further discussion of the role of the
Advocate General, see Vlad Perju, Reason and Authority in the European Court of Justice, 49 VA. J.
INT'L L. 307, 354-56 (2009).
46. Case C-411/05, Palacios, 2007 E.C.R. at 1-8535 (opinion of Advocate General Mazik).
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Subsection II.C. 1 below explores the available cross-national survey data.
Surprisingly, this data suggests that similar stereotypes prevail on both sides
of the Atlantic.
In addition, courts in the United States and the European Union are very
different, composed of judges with different ideologies, and structured to
review legislative decisions with different degrees of deference. However,
while hypotheses about differences in courts are plausible, they often point in
the wrong direction. For example, civil procedure in the United States and in
EU member states differs dramatically, but in ways that should make disparate
impact lawsuits much harder in Europe. We see the exact opposite. Subsection
II.C.2 below presents some relevant background information on courts in the
United States and the European Union, while Subsection II.C.3 mentions
plausible alternative theories.
The discussion below suggests why important differences between the
United States and the European Union cannot account for the patterns of
antidiscrimination cases we observe. The central difficulty is that these
patterns are quite complex: EU courts do not uniformly favor plaintiffs, but
instead permit certain kinds of claims that would be rejected in the United
States and reject other claims that U.S. courts would accept.
The theory of path dependence developed here aims to explain these
complex patterns. The path-dependence argument leaves substantial scope for
culture, politics, and diverse other factors to influence the outcomes of
particular cases. However, path dependence implies that while culture and
politics can be very influential during critical junctures, the scope for these
influences narrows over time. The Subsections below begin the discussion
about cross-national differences and similarities, a discussion that continues in
subsequent Parts analyzing particular cases.
1. Citizens'Attitudes Toward Minority Groups
Cultural differences could drive divergence in legal doctrines. For
example, a theory of cultural differences might posit that Americans and
Europeans have different attitudes toward same-sex couples or immigrants,
and courts respond to these attitudes in shaping doctrine. Or, perhaps citizens
have different preferences toward appropriate policy solutions. Available
cross-national survey data is limited, but does not lend support to theories of
major cultural differences across the Atlantic. While stereotypes about
different groups are pervasive in both Europe and in the United States, no
obvious transatlantic difference appears in the patterns these stereotypes take.
The International Social Science Program (ISSP) and the World Values
Survey are the two major sources of cross-nationally comparable public
opinion data. The most recent World Values Survey suggests that certain
biases are alive and well on both sides of the Atlantic. In 2005, 14% of
Americans responded that they would not like "immigrants" or "foreign
47. See also Katerina Linos & Martin West, Self-Interest, Social Beliefs, and Attitudes to
Redistribution: Re-Addressing the Issue of Cross-National Variation, 19 EUR. Soc. REv. 393 (2003)
(systematically addressing the question of cross-national differences in public opinion on social policy
questions).
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workers" as neighbors, while 27% responded that they would not like
"homosexuals" as neighbors. 48 But U.S. responses do not stand out in
comparative perspective. Thirteen percent of German respondents, 15% of
British respondents, 15% of Italian respondents and 36% of French
respondents mentioned that they would not like "immigrants" or "foreign
workers" as neighbors. Fifteen percent of German respondents, 17% of British
respondents, 24% of Italian respondents and 29% of French respondents
mentioned "homosexuals" among the groups they would not like as
neighbors. Similarly, a 1998 ISSP survey indicated that large majorities of
both the European and American public believe that "sexual relations between
two adults of the same sex" are wrong.49
Where available, more specific questions related to employment
discrimination also show patterns of cross-national similarity. In the 2005
World Values Survey, respondents were asked whether they agreed with the
statement that "when jobs are scarce, employers should give priority to
[citizens] over immigrants." This idea was popular in both the United States
and Europe: support ranged from 42% in France, to 49% in Germany, 53% in
Britain, 58% in the United States, and 64% in Italy.
50
Searching for cultural differences that might explain early sex-conscious
and race-blind cases is harder because cross-nationally comparable surveys
only date from the 1980s. In 1985, the ISSP included several questions about
race and sex in its first set of surveys. These surveys suggest that race and sex
discrimination were perceived to be about equally important in the United
States and EU member states where the survey was conducted. In 1987, the
earliest year for which comparative data is available, 40% of Americans
believed that one's race was essential, very important, or fairly important for
getting ahead in life. That placed them at approximately the middle of citizens
surveyed in EU countries: 23% of Italian respondents, 25% of Dutch
respondents, 49% of British respondents, and 50% of German respondents
agreed.5' Similarly, 38% of Americans believed that whether one was born a
man or a woman was essential, very important, or fairly important for getting
ahead in life. Seventeen percent of Dutch respondents, 35% of Italian
respondents, 35% of British respondents, and 47% of Germans agreed. Again,
the U.S. public does not seem to stand out.
52
48. For the 2005 Official Data File, see World Values Survey Ass'n, World Values Survey
2005 Official Data File v.20090901 (2009), http://www.wvsevsdb.com/wvs/WVSData.jsp [hereinafter
World Values 2005 Data File]. The responses to the survey are available at the Association's website in
a format downloadable for statistical analysis software. For the questionnaire used in the 2005 Survey,
see World Values Survey Ass'n, 2005-2006 World Values Survey, http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/
statistics/WVSQuestSplitVers OECD_Aballot.pdf (last visited Nov. 17, 2009) [hereinafter 2005-2006
World Values Survey].
49. Only 18% of Italian respondents, 25% of U.S. respondents, 34% of U.K. respondents, and
38% of German respondents answered that sexual relations between two adults of the same sex are "not
wrong at all." INT'L Soc. SURVEY PROGRAM, ZA-No. 3190, CODEBOOK: RELIGION 11, at 7 (1998),
available at http://www.za.uni-koeln.de/data/en/issp/codebooks/ZA3190_cdb.pdf.
50. See World Values 2005 Data File, supra note 48; 2005-2006 World Values Survey, supra
note 48.
51. See INT'L SOC. SURVEY PROGRAM, ZA No. 1680, CODEBOOK: SOCIAL INEQUALITY 58
(1987), available at http://www.za.uni-koeln.de/data/en/issp/codebooks/ZA 1680_cdb.pdf.
52. Id. at 61.
Path Dependence in Discrimination Law
Alternatively, one could hypothesize that it is not attitudes about the
importance of discrimination as such, but rather attitudes about how to
respond to discrimination, that divide Americans and Europeans. The 1985
ISSP survey asked whether "[w]omen should be given preferential treatment
when applying for jobs or promotions." This was an unpopular position on
both sides of the Atlantic-12% of Americans, as compared to 7% of Britons,
11% of Germans, and 19% of Italians agreed.53
Nor do more nuanced questions about sex and work-family balance
suggest that Americans were outliers. The question of attitudes toward part-
time work is of particular importance to the discussions that follow, since U.S.
and EU courts took different and consequential positions on this issue. One
might think that perhaps EU citizens disproportionately prized part-time work
as appropriate for women or for women with young children. However, in the
earliest available surveys, large majorities of both U.S. and EU respondents
believed that married women should work full-time, rather than part-time or
not at all, before they had children. 54 On the other hand, in the mid-1980s,
majorities on both sides of the Atlantic thought married women with children
under school age should stay at home, sizeable minorities believed they
should work part-time, and only small minorities believed they should work
full-time.5 5
The above statistics, while incomplete, show surprising similarities in
EU and U.S. citizens' attitudes about the prevalence and importance of
discrimination and about appropriate government responses. Moreover,
workplace patterns that gave rise to early sex discrimination claims were very
similar in the United States and in Europe. For example, in the United States,
the airline industry was targeted most in early sex discrimination complaints
to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), as well as in
National Organization of Women activism, for its practice of requiring
women stewardesses to retire upon marriage or reaching a certain age.
Similarly, the first sex discrimination cases heard by the ECJ concerned
exactly this industry practice.
57
2. Courts in the United States and the European Union
Even if public opinion in Europe and the United States has been similar,
important differences in the court systems of the two jurisdictions could
account for the divergence in antidiscrimination doctrine. The discussion that
follows highlights key differences in court structure and composition.
53. See INT'L SOC. SURVEY PROGRAM, ZA No. 1490, CODEBOOK: ROLE OF GOVERNMENT 1, at
61 (1985), available at http://www.za.uni-koeln.de/data/en/issp/codebooks/ZA 1490_cdb.pdf.
54. See INT'L SOC. SURVEY PROGRAM, ZA No. 1700, CODEBOOK: FAMILY AND SEX ROLES 50
(1988), available at http://www.za.uni-koeln.de/data/enlissp/codebooks/ZA 1700_cdb.pdf.
55. Id. at 51.
56. See SKRENTNY, supra note 1, at 114, 118.
57. Case 149/77, Defrenne v. Soci~t6 Anonyme Beige de Navigation Mrienne Sabena, 1978
E.C.R. 1365; Case 80/70, Defrenne v. Belgian State, 1971 E.C.R. 445. These cases challenged a policy
of Sabena, the Belgian National Airline, which required female cabin personnel to retire at forty while
male cabin personnel could retire at fifty-five.
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However, it proves difficult to connect these differences to the evolution of
antidiscrimination doctrine in the two jurisdictions.
A first key difference concerns federalism. For many purposes, the
European Union is a supranational organization, rather than a federal state. In
the formative decades of the European Community, the position of the ECJ
relative to national constitutional courts, and the ability of private litigants to
invoke EU law directly, were contested. 58 This structural difference could
limit the ability of the ECJ to interpret laws in ways that strengthen individual
rights but conflict with member state preferences. Following theories of
federalism, we should expect courts in strong federations to show limited
deference to member states' decisions, and federal courts in weak federations
to show great deference to member states' decisions.
However, between 1971 and 2003, 68% of cases challenging national
laws or practices in the social policy arena succeeded. 59 More tellingly, when
national governments made formal written observations in cases not involving
their own legal systems, the Court often ruled in the opposite direction. For
example, the United Kingdom submitted written observations in 44% of all
cases not involving the U.K. legal system, and the Court ruled consistently
with the U.K. position only 58% of the time.60 These findings "bring into
question claims that the ECJ decisions are systematically influenced by the
policy positions of member states. 61 Moreover, in the social policy domain,
"the ECJ is nearly as likely (57%) to issue adverse rulings in cases with the
highest political and economic impact" as in cases "with a low impact.
' 62
A second hypothesis concerns the structure and political orientation of
the Court itself. Perhaps the ECJ allowed pro-plaintiff interpretations to
prevail more frequently because its judges have been more liberal or more
feminist than their U.S. counterparts. Are ECJ judges particularly sympathetic
to employee or women's issues? The ECJ is sometimes accused of ideological
bias, but the typical allegation paints the ECJ as a conservative court intent on
promoting free market principles and striking downprotectionist measures.
63
Moreover, the ECJ was an all-male court until 1999.6p
It is also instructive to examine the viewpoints of individual judges.
While the US record makes this possible, it is difficult to investigate the
ideology of individual judges in the European context, because the ECJ issues
unsigned opinions. Advocates General, however, sign their opinions and
anecdotal evidence suggests that their interpretations of EU and national law
58. See ALTER, supra note 39.
59. See RACHEL A. CICHOWSKI, THE EUROPEAN COURT AND CIVIL SOCIETY: LITIGATION,
MOBILIZATION AND GOVERNANCE 90 (2007).
60. Id. at 86.
61. Id. at88.
62. Id. Cichowski defines "cases with the highest political and economic impact" as those in
which four or more member states file written observations and cases with "low impact" as those in
which only one member state files an observation. Id.
63. See, e.g., Fritz W. Scharpf, The Joint-Decision Trap: Lessons from German Federalism
and European Integration, 66 PuB. ADMIN. 239, 241 (1988).
64. For a discussion of the possible influence of women law clerks on ECJ opinions before
1999, see generally Sally J. Kenney, Beyond Principals and Agents: Seeing Courts as Organizations by
Comparing Rd'frendaires at the European Court of Justice and Law Clerks at the U.S. Supreme Court,
33 COMP. POL. STUD. 593 (2000).
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were not consistently driven by an underlying political ideology. For example,
an important difference in the early development of U.S. and EU law
concerned the treatment of full-time and part-time workers. U.S. courts have
generally been unwilling to consider any comparisons between the two
categories of workers, while EU courts have compared the two and
dramatically expanded benefits available to part-timers. When interpreting EU
law, Advocate General Slynn called for this expansion of protections for part-
timers. However, in his prior career on the U.K. bench, he had ruled out such
comparisons categorically, stating that a part-time job is "basically a different
kind of job" from a full-time job. In summary, important differences in court
structure and composition do not straightforwardly connect to the evolution of
discrimination doctrine.
3. Other Differences
European and U.S. jurisdictions differ substantially in several other
respects. Two that merit particular consideration are background employment
law norms and civil procedure principles.
While there is important variation among EU member states, and some
variation among U.S. states, in general, EU member states' employment laws
are more likely to offer greater protections to workers. For example, in the
United States, antidiscrimination law operates within a system of at-will
employment, while many European workers can only be fired for cause. As a
direct result, many U.S. antidiscrimination cases concern terminations, while
many EU cases concern refusals to hire, terminations during probationary
periods, and unequal treatment in the course of the employment relationship.
However, it is more difficult to predict how the fact that a jurisdiction
has extensive or limited employment law protections should shape the content
of antidiscrimination law. Perhaps the fact that the United States has limited
employment law protections is indicative of cultural attitudes or political
institutions that disfavor employees; these cultural attitudes or political
institutions could in turn limit employees' abilities to successfully make out
claims under antidiscrimination law. Or, we might see the exact opposite:
perhaps one should understand employment laws and employment
antidiscrimination laws as substitutes: the weaker the set of employment law
protections a country has, the stronger the demand for extensive
antidiscrimination law. It is even more difficult to connect background
employment law norms with the particular, complex distribution of
antidiscrimination protections we observe. U.S. courts are more reluctant than
EU courts to accept employee prima facie arguments of discrimination, but
U.S. courts are more reluctant to accept employer defenses.
European and U.S. jurisdictions also differ dramatically on procedural
devices central to discrimination cases. Disparate impact litigation fits the
U.S. class action model well because disparate impact claims typically involve
allegations and statistics concerning an entire class of employees, rather than
65. Handley v. H. Mono Limited, 1979 I.C.R. 147, 155 (Employment App. Trib.) (U.K.). I
thank Sally Kenney for this point.
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an individual worker. 66 This type of litigation seems to fit civil law models
that emphasize individual claims less well, and yet it has flourished in the
European Union since being exported there. 67 Similarly, the burden-shifting
rules adopted by the ECJ do not necessarily fit well with the legal traditions of
the member states. "[T]he issue of burden of proof . . . is complicated by
differences between the adversarial and inquisitorial approaches to be found in
the various Member States .... ,,68 In short, procedural differences, while
present, do not seem capable of explaining the two jurisdictions' differing
doctrines.
This brief discussion of differences and similarities across the Atlantic
can only offer general background material, and point interested readers to
scholarship that investigates these factors more closely. Therefore, Parts III
and IV below turn to important cases, to examine how diverse ideological
motives and doctrinal concerns influenced particular doctrinal choices.
III. ORIGINS AND EARLY DEVELOPMENT OF THE
DISPARATE IMPACT DOCTRINE
In the 1960s and 1970s, some employers in both the United States and
Europe reacted to new antidiscrimination laws by introducing additional
requirements that perpetuated past discrimination. U.S. courts first developed
disparate impact theory to limit employers' ability to circumvent race
discrimination laws in this way. EU courts first introduced disparate impact
theory to limit employers' ability to circumvent sex discrimination laws in
similar circumstances. In both the United States and the European Union,
disparate impact theory allowed plaintiffs to challenge seemingly neutral
employer practices that had a substantial adverse impact on protected groups.
However, in the United States today, many authors consider that the
once-powerful disparate impact doctrine is dead.69 Plaintiffs in employment
discrimination cases fare worse than plaintiffs generally, 70 and plaintiffs
making disparate impact claims are particularly likely to lose.71 In contrast, in
66. See, e.g., Allan G. King & Camille C. Ozumba, Strange Fiction: The "Class
Certification" Decision in FLSA Collective Actions, 24 LAB. LAW. 267, 288 (2009) ("Courts often find
[the disparate impact] theory conducive to class treatment because all protected group members
subjected to such screening have suffered discrimination, irrespective of whether the challenged criteria
were the but-for cause of their exclusion from any employment position.").
67. For a more extensive discussion of how civil procedure rules influence employment
discrimination claims in U.S. and EU jurisdictions, see generally Suk, supra note 37. See also Suk,
supra note 21.
68. See EVELYN ELLIS, EU ANTI-DISCRIMINATION LAW 98 (2005).
69. See, e.g., Michael Selmi, Was the Disparate Impact Theory a Mistake?, 53 UCLA L. REV.
701, 741-43, 753-55 (2006); see also Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2681-83 (2009) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (suggesting that the disparate impact doctrine may violate the Equal Protection Clause).
70. See Kevin M. Clermont & Steward J. Schwab, How Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs
Fare in Federal Court, I J. EMPIRICAL L. STUD. 429, 440-41 (2004); Wendy Parker, Lessons in Losing:
Race Discrimination in Employment, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 889, 894 (2006); Michael Selmi, Why
Are Employment Discrimination Cases So Hard To Win?, 61 LA. L. REV. 555, 559-61 (2001).
71. See Selmi, supra note 69, at 738 (reporting the results of an empirical study, which found
that of 130 relevant disparate impact cases appealed between 1984 and 2001, only twenty-five resulted
in plaintiff victories (decisions reversed, affirmed, or remanded in favor of the plaintiff), that fourteen of
those victories occurred during the period from 1984 to 1985, and that of those twenty-five successes,
60% were remands rather than outright victories).
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the European Union, the disparate impact doctrine has flourished, permitting
diverse groups to challenge a broad range of potentially discriminatory
practices in court and thus make fundamental changes to the structure of
European workplaces. This Article attributes this divergence to decisions
made at critical junctures decades ago. To illuminate those decisions, this Part
reviews key early cases from a comparative perspective.
Contrary to theories about cultural particularities, EU courts did not
reference fundamental European values in their first cases. Instead, they
borrowed explicitly and directly from U.S. doctrine. In fact, these very first
cases did not show European courts to be sex-conscious. In both the United
States and Europe, neither courts nor commentators perceived the full
significance of the disparate impact doctrine. This is consistent with path-
dependence theories that attribute large consequences to small and
chronologically distant choices. Section III.A reviews these first cases.
Section III.B explores why U.S. and EU law later diverged. After
plaintiffs won substantial victories under the disparate impact theory,
defendants in both the United States and the European Union invited courts to
clarify the scope of this potentially revolutionary doctrine. Could plaintiffs
make out a prima facie disparate impact case by relying exclusively on
statistics? In the European Union, courts answered yes; in the United States,
they answered no. Instead, U.S. courts introduced the specific practice
requirement: to make out a prima facie disparate impact case, an American
plaintiff must not only show a statistically significant disparity, but must also
identify a specific, facially neutral employment practice and show a causal
connection between the specific employment practice and the statistical
disparity.
I argue that the paradigmatic categories of sex and race influenced how
EU and U.S. courts approached the specific practice question, leading them to
arrive at different answers. The sex-consciousness paradigm underlying EU
discrimination law portrayed male and female workers as fundamentally
different: women's biological and societal roles were understood to shape
women's preferences and suitability for particular jobs. Moreover, a sex-
conscious court was willing to consider at least some of these traits
intrinsically linked to the concept of being female, and worthy of protection.
Thus, in the European Union, baseline statistics sufficed to make out a prima
facie discrimination case because they were implicitly coupled with a theory
about men's and women's biological and social roles. The ECJ placed the
burden on employers to examine whether alternative practices were feasible.
In contrast, the race paradigm underlying U.S. discrimination law portrayed
black and white workers as essentially interchangeable. No similar implicit
theory was easily available and acceptable to explain racial statistical
disparities. As a result, U.S. courts introduced a requirement that plaintiffs
provide a theory connecting a specific employer practice to the observed
disparity pattern. In sum, sex-consciousness on the part of EU courts, and
race-blindness on the part of U.S. courts, led to different answers on the
specific practice doctrine.
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The specific practice requirement is typically presented as a political
compromise-a conservative victory in the U.S. Supreme Court that was
somewhat tempered by a more liberal Congress' effort to rewrite
antidiscrimination law through the Civil Rights Act of 1991. Politics
undoubtedly played an important role in the particular outcomes reached at
the critical junctures in U.S. and EU debates. However, the comparative
perspective highlights that the race paradigm shaped the political positions of
both U.S. liberals and U.S. conservatives, while the sex paradigm similarly
influenced EU actors with differing political views. Thus, even if liberals had
had greater political success in the United States, the doctrinal legacy of the
race paradigm would nevertheless remain.
In both the United States and the European Union, doctrinal choices
made in early race and sex cases were exported to claims brought by other
groups without much consideration of how they might operate in these new
contexts. Section III.C explores these processes. Because many workplace
features correlate with sex, age, and disability, the specific practice
requirement in the United States created even greater hurdles when exported
to these claims. In Europe, by contrast, the doctrine more easily permits
plaintiffs to make out a prima facie case based on statistics alone. Indeed, EU
law now allows plaintiffs to challenge practices that have not yet caused harm
72but have foreseeable harmful consequences for protected groups.
A. Origins of Disparate Impact Claims in the United States and the
European Union
Modem disparate impact doctrine stems from the U.S. Supreme Court's
decision in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.73 Prior to the enactment of the 1964
Civil Rights Act, Duke Power had segregated its workforce, restricting
African Americans to its low-paid labor department.74 Once Title VII entered
into force, Duke Power introduced a requirement for applicants seeking jobs
in better-paid departments either to pass two aptitude tests or to have received
a high school degree.75 In Griggs, the Court invalidated these facially neutral
tests that were not clearly job-related nor grounded in business necessity
because they had a disproportionate impact on African Americans' access to
better paid jobs. 76
The ECJ directly borrowed this doctrine in Jenkins v. Kingsgate.7 Prior
to 1975, Kingsgate, a U.K. clothing manufacturer, paid male and female
employees at different hourly rates, but made no distinctions in the pay of full-
and part-time workers. 78 In November 1975, a month before the Equal Pay
Act of 1970 and the Sex Discrimination Act of 1975 became effective,
Kingsgate abolished differences between wages for men and women, and
72. See Council Directive 2000/43, art. 2(2)(b), 2000 O.J. (L 180) 22, 24 (EC); Council
Directive 2000/78, art. 2(2)(b), 2000 O.J. (L 303) 16, 18 (EC).
73. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
74. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 420 F.2d 1225, 1228-29 (4th Cir. 1970).
75. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 427-28.
76. Id. at 431-36.
77. Case 96/80, Jenkins v. Kingsgate (Clothing Prods.) Ltd., 1981 E.C.R. 911.
78. Id. at 929 (opinion of Advocate General Warner).
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introduced differences in the hourly rates of full-time and part-time workers.
79
All but one of the part-time workers at Kingsgate were women.8 ° The ECJ
held that this pay policy would violate EU law if the national court found that
it had a disproportionate impact on women. 81 The U.K. Employment Tribunal
invalidated Kingsgate's policy on these grounds.
82
Contemporaries did not immediately understand the consequences of
these radical doctrinal shifts. "[U]nlike Brown, Griggs did not garner the big
headlines in newspapers when the decision was announced by the Court.
'8
Similarly, European labor advocates initially read Jenkins and questioned
"how far the European Court is committed to a notion of developing women's
rights in the labour market." 84 Indeed, the far-reaching consequences of these
cases were not evident until decades later.8 5 The evolution of disparate impact
doctrine from a modest start into a radically powerful doctrine is in line with
the predictions of path-dependence theory, which attributes large shifts to
small and chronologically distant precedents. These developments are less
consistent with theories that assume proportionality in cause-effect
relationships.
The reasoning in Jenkins, and other early European cases, also cast
doubt on the cultural differences theory. If the current divergence between EU
and U.S. law is due to differences in values, we might expect to see some
references to European values in the legal reasoning. We do not. Instead, key
players all referenced U.S. precedents as the source of their arguments.
Anthony Lester, Ms. Jenkins' lawyer, called his strategy "the Griggs
approach."8 6 Advocate General Warner also referenced Griggs and argued
that it was "the correct approach.,8 7 Moreover, he developed a more general
methodological point about the appropriateness of borrowing from U.S. law:
As has been observed more than once, the Supreme Court of the United States and this
Court often find themselves confronted with similar problems. Although of course the
provisions of the United States Civil Rights Act of 1964 that were in question in the
Griggs case were worded differently from Article 119 of the Treaty, their essential
79. Id. at 929-30.
80. Id. at 929.
81. Id. at 926 (judgment).
82. Jenkins v. Kingsgate (Clothing Prods.) Ltd., 1981 I.C.R. 715 (Employment App. Trib.)
(U.K.).
83. Robert Belton, Title VII at Forty: A Brief Look at the Birth, Death, and Resurrection of the
Disparate Impact Theory of Discrimination, 22 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 431,455 (2005).
84. Erika Szyszczak, Differences in Pay for Part-Time Workers, 44 MOD. L. REv. 672, 681
(1981); see also J.M. Barrett, Part-Time Workers and Equal Pay: The Case of Jenkins v. Kingsgate, 6
HuM. RTs. REv. 174, 189 (1981) (calling the Jenkins decision "extremely disappointing" and "totally
ambiguous").
85. See, e.g., George Rutherglen, Disparate Impact Under Title VII: An Objective Theory of
Discrimination, 73 VA. L. REv. 1297, 1297 (1987) ("The theory of disparate impact is the single most
important judicial contribution to title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964."); see also Kingsley R.
Browne, The Civil Rights Act of 1991: A "Quota Bill, " A Codification of Griggs, a Partial Return to
Wards Cove, or All of the Above?, 43 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 287, 294 (1993) ("Griggs was, without a
doubt, the most significant Title VII case ever decided; indeed, it is almost trite to refer to it as a
'landmark' decision in the law.").
86. See Case 96/80, Jenkins v. Kingsgate (Clothing Prods.) Ltd., 1981 E.C.R. 911, 936
(opinion of Advocate General Warner) ("Counsel called this the 'Griggs approach' after the decision of
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purpose was the same .... I draw considerable comfort from finding that my conclusion
accords with the conclusions of that court in those cases [Griggs and Dothard].88
Similarly, the U.K. Employment Tribunal applying the ECJ judgment in
Jenkins cited repeatedly to Griggs.89 Bilka-Kaufhaus GmbH v. Weber Von
Hartz, the second ECJ disparate impact case, spelled out the doctrine more
clearly.90 A different Advocate General, Marco Darmon, was assigned to this
case, but he too referenced Griggs, rather than any European values, as the
source of the disparate impact doctrine.
91
It is hard to detect sex consciousness-consciousness of particular
obstacles women workers face-in these first ECJ cases. In both Bilka and
Jenkins, the ECJ clarified that an employer could justify the differential
treatment of part-time and full-time workers if the employer's intention was to
discourage part-time work.92 Moreover, the Bilka Court stated explicitly that
EU law did not require an employer "to take into account the particular
difficulties faced by persons with family responsibilities."
93
After these initial cases, the doctrine of disparate impact was used to
challenge diverse employer practices in both the United States and in the
European Union. The employer practices at issue in Griggs and Jenkins were
challenged particularly frequently, and with great success. This pattern is
consistent with path-dependence theory, which emphasizes how minor early
events can result in significant developments over time. Moreover, the ECJ
reversed its early difference-blind stance derived from the United States, and
gradually developed a sex-conscious jurisprudence, acknowledging special
difficulties women faced in balancing work and family. Many theories of
cultural difference would predict that stereotypes about women's roles would
decrease over time, and that the European Union and the United States would
converge instead of diverge.
Dothard v. Rawlinson, the first U.S. case applying disparate impact
doctrine to sex discrimination claims, challenged minimum height and weight
requirements. 94 Dothard marks an important extension of Griggs, because it
clarified that disparate impact theory was not limited to situations where an
employer's history of discrimination made new reclassification strategies
seem suspicious. Yet, the Court extended disparate impact to sex
discrimination claims that differed critically from the claims in Griggs
"without skipping a beat." 95 Cultural theories would predict that in applying
disparate impact to sex discrimination for the first time, a court might consider
88, Id. at 936-37.
89. Jenkins v. Kingsgate (Clothing Prods.) Ltd., 1981 I.C.R. 715, 724-25 (Employment App.
Trib.) (U.K.).
90. Case 170/84, Bilka-Kaufhaus GmbH v. Weber von Hartz, 1986 E.C.R. 1607, 1627
("Article 119 of the EEC Treaty is infringed by a department store company which excludes part-time
employees from its occupational pension scheme, where that exclusion affects a far greater number of
women than men, unless the undertaking shows that the exclusion is based on objectively justified
factors unrelated to any discrimination on grounds of sex.").
91. Id. at 1616 (opinion of Advocate General Darmon).
92, Case 96/80, Jenkins, 1981 E.C.R. at 925; Case 170/84, Bilka, 1986 E.C.R at 1628-29.
93. Case 170/84, Bilka, 1986 E.C.R. at 1630.
94. 433 U.S. 321 (1977).
95. Samuel Estreicher, The Story of Griggs v. Duke Power Co., in EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION STORIES 153, 167 (Joel Wm. Friedman ed., 2006).
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differences and similarities between race and sex. Instead, the Dothard Court
avoided such comparisons and extended Griggs by interpreting the same
words in the same way it had before, despite the new context. 96 Diverse
employer practices have been challenged under the disparate impact doctrine,
including experience prerequisites, 97 inquiries into applicants' arrest records,
98
drug tests,99 and residency requirements. 00 From a comparative perspective,
what is most striking is the prevalence of challenges to scored tests initially
challenged in Griggs. The American Bar Association's 2007 guide to
employment discrimination law devotes over one hundred pages to the case
law applying disparate impact law to specific employment decisions. 10 1 Sixty-
five percent of these pages are devoted to scored tests.
10 2
Similarly, in the European Union, disparate impact doctrine spread to
diverse other employer practices, but the initial practice used to reclassify
employees in Jenkins, part-time status, was challenged with highly
disproportionate frequency and success. A long set of cases challenging part-
time status classifications followed Jenkins and Bilka, slowly expanding the
doctrine. For example, in Rinner-Kiihn v. FWW Spezial-Gebdudereinigung
GmbH & Co., the ECJ held that excluding part-time workers from sick pay
benefits was discriminatory if it disproportionately impacted women, even
though only workers who worked less than ten hours per week were
excluded. 10 3 In Nimz v. Freie und Hansestadt Hamburg, the ECJ rejected a
collective agreement that gave promotions to part-time workers at a slower
rate than full-time workers on the grounds that part-timers acquired skills
more slowly. 0 4 After a long line of cases, the ECJ has ended up considering
almost any kind of disadvantageous treatment of part-time workers as "prima
facie indirectly discriminatory ... on the basis that many more women than
men are obliged by their domestic responsibilities to opt for part-time
work.' 1 5 The principle that differential treatment of part-timers is prima facie
discriminatory and requires justification by the employer was finally codified
in Council Directive 97/81 on Part-Time Workers.°6 It is striking that over
time, classifications once considered entirely legitimate became presumptively
illegitimate.
Sex-consciousness can be seen not only in changing case outcomes, but
also in changing court rhetoric. Whereas the Bilka Court, in the mid-1980s,
refused to force employers "to take into account the particular difficulties
faced by persons with family responsibilities,"' 0 7 by the late 1990s, the ECJ
96. See Maltz, supra note 34, at 1354-55.
97. See, e.g., Spurlock v. United Airlines, Inc., 475 F.2d 216 (10th Cir. 1972).
98. See, e.g., Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315, 320 (8th Cir. 1971).
99. See, e.g., Davis v. City of Dallas, 777 F.2d 205, 223-25 (5th Cir. 1985).
100. See, e.g., NAACP v. Town of Harrison, 940 F.2d 792 (3d Cir. 1991).
101. See I BARBARA T. LINDEMANN & PAUL GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW
161-264 (4th ed. 2007).
102. See id. at 161-228.
103. Case C-171/88, Rinner-Kihn v. FWW Spezial-Gebiiudereinigung GmbH & Co. KG, 1989
E.C.R. 2743.
104. Case C-184/89, Nimz v. Freie und Hansestadt Hamburg, 1991 E.C.R. 1-297.
105. See ELLIS, supra note 68, at 92.
106. Council Directive 97/81, 1998 .. (L 14) 9.
107. Case 170/84, Bilka-Kaufhaus GmbH v. Weber von Hartz, 1986 E.C.R. 1607, 1630.
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declared that "Community policy [in the area of sex antidiscrimination law] is
to encourage and, if possible, adapt working conditions to family
responsibilities."'
0 8
B. Evolution of Disparate Impact in the United States and the
European Union
After important plaintiff victories under the disparate impact doctrine,
both the U.S. Supreme Court and the ECJ had to determine the scope of the
doctrine. In both jurisdictions, a plaintiff must show that an employer's
practice has a substantial adverse impact on a protected group. However, it is
now substantially easier for plaintiffs in the European Union to make out a
prima facie case.
The ECJ only had jurisdiction over sex discrimination cases early on,
and over time became more attentive to arguments that sex was fundamentally
linked to diverse socially important traits. For this reason, once a plaintiff had
shown a substantial disparity in men's and women's employment outcomes,
the ECJ did not require plaintiffs to supply a detailed theory of causation
linking a specific employer practice to the statistical disparity. The ECJ could
infer that observed statistical disparities were related to fundamental and
protected traits linked to sex, such as "motherhood." Sex-consciousness thus
made it easier for plaintiffs to establish a prima facie case on the basis of
statistics alone.
In contrast, U.S. courts first addressed race discrimination claims at a
time when the race-blindness paradigm was dominant. Because U.S. courts
did not want to assume that race was linked to almost any other trait, they
asked that plaintiffs demonstrate with substantial specificity what employer
practices caused observed statistical disparities, and how exactly the causal
connection worked. They thus introduced the specific practice requirement to
U.S. disparate impact doctrine. The paragraphs below present the key cases
that established the two jurisdictions' different positions on the specific
practice doctrine: Wards Cove'09 in the United States, and Enderby' 10 in the
European Union.
In the United States, the specific practice requirement had the
straightforward and intended consequence of making it more difficult for
racial minorities to make out disparate impact claims. However, courts
casually and quickly extended it to claims brought by other groups, which
magnified its consequences. With regard to women workers, the theory of
equal pay for comparable worth, an effort that would have increased pay for
women in female-dominated fields, succeeded in Europe but failed in the
United States due in part to difficulties resulting from the specific practice
requirement. A second consequence of the doctrine concerned
accommodations for the disabled. While individual claims would succeed in
the United States under the Americans with Disabilities Act, Title VII's
potential to reform entire workplaces was radically limited by the specific
108. Case C-243/95, Hill v. Revenue Comm'rs, 1998 E.C.R. 1-3739, 1-3772.
109. Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
110. Case C-127/92, Enderby v. Frenchay Health Auth., 1993 E.C.R. 1-5535.
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practice doctrine. More generally, challenges to background employment
norms such as employers' ability to insist that all workers work full-time, take
limited absences, or relocate when the employer so desires, became much less
likely to succeed under U.S. law as compared to EU law.
1. Critical Juncture: The U.S. Wards Cove Decision and the
Introduction of the Specific Practice Requirement
Wards Cove constitutes a critical juncture in the development of U.S.
antidiscrimination doctrine because it dramatically increased the probability
that courts would require plaintiffs to identify how a specific practice causes
particular statistical disparities."' In this case, non-white cannery workers
filed a class action suit and used statistics to show that non-whites filled the
low-paying, unskilled jobs, while whites filled the high-paying jobs.112 They
also alleged that a series of employment practices, including "nepotism, a
rehire preference, a lack of objective hiring criteria, separate hiring channels, a
practice of not promoting from within" led, in aggregate, to the segregated
workforce. 113 The Wards Cove majority held it was not enough to point to an
aggregate statistical disparity and to questionable employment practices, but
that the plaintiffs would have to show how the challenged practices caused the
disparity in employment opportunities for whites and non-whites. 114 In
addition, the Wards Cove majority made it easier for defendants to rebut
prima facie disparate impact claims."15 Although the 1991 Civil Rights Act
repudiated key aspects of the Wards Cove decision, it codified the specific
practice requirement, stating that the plaintiff must demonstrate that "each
particular challenged employment practice causes a disparate impact.""
6
The race-blindness paradigm helps explain the majority's position in
Wards Cove. Absent a specific practice requirement, the majority feared that
employers would be held liable for diverse "innocent causes that may lead to
statistical imbalances in the composition of their work forces." 117 This
111. See, e.g., James S. Bryan, Shifting the Burdens in Disparate Impact Cases: Wards Cove
Packing v. Atonio, 6 LAB. LAW. 233 (1990); L. Camille Herbert, Redefining the Burdens of Proof in
Title VII Litigation: Will the Disparate Impact Theory Survive Wards Cove and the Civil Rights Act of
1990?, 32 B.C. L. REV. 1 (1990); Mack A. Player, Is Griggs Dead-Reflecting (Fearfully) on Wards
Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 17 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1 (1989).
112. Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 647.
113. Id.at647-48.
114. Id. at 657.
115. More specifically, the Wards Cove majority held that once a plaintiff makes out a prima
facie case only the burden of production shifts to the defendant; the burden of persuasion remains with
the plaintiff throughout. Id. at 659-60. In addition, the Wards Cove majority held that an employer need
not show that the challenged practice is essential to his business, but only that it serves, in a significant
way, legitimate employer goals that cannot be equally well served through alternative practices lacking a
discriminatory impact. Id. at 660-61.
116. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(B)(i) (2006); see also Appleton v. Deloitte & Touche, L.L.P., 168
F.R.D. 221, 226 (M.D. Tenn. 1996) ("Courts have determined that the [1991] Act did not alter the
'particularity' aspect of Wards Cove."). However, the 1991 Act did provide a narrow exception to the
specific practice requirement. For cases where the plaintiff "can demonstrate to the court that the
elements of a respondent's decisionmaking process are not capable of separation for analysis, the
decisionmaking process may be analyzed as one employment practice." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(B)(i);
see also infra note 136.
117. Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 657.
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statement reflects the Court's belief that race should not be connected to any
socially relevant characteristics. Because the Court refused to give any content
to race, it required the plaintiff to supply the causal connection between the
observed statistical disparity and race.
U.S. commentators typically interpret the Wards Cove decision and the
1991 Civil Rights Act as the outcome of fierce political battles." 18 The
comparative perspective illuminates surprising similarities between American
liberals and conservatives and shows how deeply the race-blindness paradigm
influenced actors of all political stripes. Many U.S. commentators highlight
that Wards Cove was a five to four decision; under somewhat different
political conditions, the majority position could have been closer to the
dissent. However, even Justice Stevens's highly critical dissent does not
extend as far as the ECJ view to state that statistical disparities alone suffice to
shift the burden of persuasion to the employer. Unlike the ECJ, Justice
Stevens concluded that "[e]vidence that virtually all the employees in the
major categories of at-issue jobs were white, whereas about two-thirds of the
cannery workers were nonwhite, may not by itself suffice to establish a prima
facie case of discrimination."' 1 9 Justice Stevens regretted the new specific
practice requirement as articulated by the Wards Cove majority, but
acknowledged that the plaintiff must connect the harm to an act of the
employer. According to Justice Stevens, "[i]t is elementary that a plaintiff
cannot recover upon proof of injury alone; rather, the plaintiff must connect
the injury to an act of the defendant in order to establish prima facie that the
defendant is liable." 120 Justice Stevens differed with the majority only on how
strong a causal claim was necessary. Unlike the majority, he would have ruled
that "[although the causal link must have substance, the act need not
constitute the sole or primary cause of the harm."',
21
2. Critical Juncture: The EU Enderby Decision and the
Rejection of the Specific Practice Requirement
Enderby v. Frenchay Health Authority marks the critical juncture
eliminating the specific practice requirement from EU law; earlier decisions
arguably challenged specific employment practices. l22 Ms. Enderby
complained that speech therapists employed by the U.K. National Health
Service (NHS), who were predominantly female, were paid less than
pharmacists, who were predominantly male, while the two groups performed
work of equal value. The NHS, as well as the U.K. government, borrowed
118. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Reneging on History? Playing the
Court/Congress/President Civil Rights Game, 79 CAL. L. REV. 613, 640-41 (1991) (using debates over
the reversal/codification of Wards Cove in the 1991 Civil Rights Act to illustrate the interplay of
judicial, congressional, and presidential politics in the development of civil rights law).
119. Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 677 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
120. Id. at 672.
121. Id. at 672-73.
122. See Case C-127/92, Enderby v. Frenchay Health Auth., 1993 E.C.R. 1-5535, 1-5559
(opinion of Advocate General Lenz) ("In the cases concerning indirect discrimination hitherto brought
before the Court the disadvantaging of female workers was effected by reference to an objective
criterion." (footnote omitted)). Advocate General Lenz, however, recommended that the Court drop this
requirement. Id. at 1-5561.
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explicitly from U.S. law and raised a specific practice objection. 123 They
argued that Ms. Enderby had not explained which employer practice caused
the difference in pay; she only pointed to the fact that she was a psychologist
rather than a pharmacist. 124 The NHS had a transparent system of awarding
pay, based on collective bargaining processes. While separate collective
bargaining processes were set up for speech therapists and pharmacists, no
one alleged that these were tainted by sex discrimination. 25 The ECJ rejected
the defendants' argument concerning the specific practice requirement,
holding that that aggregate statistical differences were enough to shift the
burden of persuasion to the employer. The direct costs of this decision for the
NHS reached twelve million pounds sterling.
126
Sex-consciousness was critical to the ECJ decision in Enderby.
Statements by diverse participants in the legal proceedings indicate that an
implicit theory about women's social roles was essential to the finding that the
plaintiff could rely on statistics alone. Ms. Enderby argued that statistics
sufficed because the reason for the statistical disparity was obvious, and the
U.K. Court of Appeal referring the case to the ECJ agreed. As the summary of
proceedings before the ECJ indicated:
According to the appellant, there is no need to establish any requirement or condition or
barrier preventing the women in question from becoming pharmacists or psychologists.
As held by the Court of Appeal, the fact that the lower paid group, that of speech
therapists, are almost exclusively female is not a 'statistical freak' but is due to the fact
that the nature of the work, which allows employees to work part-time, makes it
particularly attractive to women and the low pay makes it on the contrary especially
unattractive to men. 127
In determining whether to insist on a specific practice requirement or
not, the U.K. Court of Appeal discussed U.S. precedents on exactly this
question, notably Wards Cove, and EU precedents that concern the disparate
impact theory generally, notably Jenkins, and explicitly acknowledged that
EU precedents prompted it to depart from U.S. jurisprudence on this point.
The court reasoned that prior ECJ decisions had recognized that certain
patterns, such as the tendency of women to disproportionately occupy part-
time jobs, were "in the nature of things."'
128
The Advocate General, Carl Lenz, used very similar reasoning, stating
that, "[a]ccording to the information before the Court, the fact that speech
therapists are almost exclusively women is also at least partly due to the
connection between the social role of women and work. The opportunities of
123. Id. at 1-5543 to -5544 (report for the hearing).
124. Id.
125. See id. at 1-5572 (judgment) ("[T]here can be no complaint that the employer has applied a
system of pay wholly lacking in transparency since the rates of pay of NHS speech therapists and
pharmacists are decided by regular collective bargaining processes in which there is no evidence of
discrimination as regards either of those two professions.").
126. See Kevin Maguire, Therapists Share £12m in Landmark Equal Pay Victory, GUARDIAN
(London), May 8, 2000, http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2000/may/08/kevinmaguire.
127. Case C-127/92, Enderby, 1993 E.C.R. at 1-5542 (report for the hearing).
128. Enderby v. Frenchay HA, 1994 I.C.R. 112, 127-28 (C.A.) (U.K.) ("In the present case we
are not dealing with a statistical freak .... [lit is to be remembered that both in Jenkins and in the other
cases involving part-time women workers it seems to have been accepted that in the nature of things
part-time workers were likely to be mainly women....").
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working part-time and of flexible arrangement of working hours are
particularly attractive to women." 129 This reasoning led him to conclude that
"attention should be directed less to the existence of a requirement or a hurdle
by means of which women suffer a disadvantage, and more to the
discriminatory result." 130 The ECJ agreed with the Advocate General and
ruled for the plaintiffs on the question of whether statistics were enough to
make out a prima facie case without elaborating on its reasoning. The ECJ
concluded that:
where significant statistics disclose an appreciable difference in pay between two jobs of
equal value, one of which is carried out almost exclusively by women and the other
predominantly by men, Article 119 of the Treaty requires the employer to show that that
difference is based on objectively justified factors unrelated to any discrimination on
grounds of sex.'
3'
C. Consequences of the Specific Practice Requirement
In the United States, the specific practice requirement weakens
employee cases, makes bottom-line defenses impossible, and may deter quota
hiring. Many race discrimination cases have failed because the plaintiff could
not identify a specific employment practice that linked statistical differences
to race.132 For example, employees who base disparate impact claims on
managers' preferences133 or on informal practices as opposed to company
policy often see their claims fail because of the specific practice
requirement. 135
Yet, the specific practice requirement has had the harshest consequences
outside the race paradigm. The specific practice requirement was quickly
exported to claims brought forth by women, as well as all claims under Title
VII, by the 1991 Civil Rights Act. It was also exported, by analogical
reasoning, to claims under antidiscrimination statutes resembling Title VII,
129. Case C-127/92, Enderby, 1993 E.C.R. at 1-5560 (opinion of Advocate General Lenz).
130. Id.
131. id. at 1-5573 (judgment).
132. See, e.g., Reshard v. Peters, 579 F. Supp. 2d 57, 75-76 (D.D.C. 2008) (holding that
statistics establishing that disproportionate numbers of blacks, women, and persons over fifty-five
occupy managerial positions are not sufficient to establish prima facie case of disparate impact because
plaintiff did not establish specific employment practice).
133. See, e.g., Gullet v. Town of Normal, 156 F. App'x 837, 842 (7th Cir. 2005) (holding that
hiring a male full-time street maintenance worker from an all-male waste division was not a company
policy but rather a manager's preference, and thus female plaintiff did not establish a specific
employment practice).
134. See, e.g., Mathis v. Wachovia, 509 F. Supp. 2d 1125, 1143 (N.D. Fla. 2007) (holding that
the absence of a policy to investigate apparent racial inequities is not considered a company policy
sufficient to meet the specific employment practice requirement).
135. While almost all successful disparate impact claims identify a causal connection between
a specific practice and a statistical discrepancy, there exist rare cases where employees have succeeded
in waiving this requirement by arguing that an employer's system should be considered as a whole under
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(l)(B)(i) (2006). See, e.g., McClain v. Lufkin Indus., Inc, 519 F.3d 264, 275-77
(5th Cir. 2008) (holding that the district court did not err in ruling that the employer's overall system of
subjective determinations for promotions constituted a specific employment practice sufficient for a
Title VII disparate impact claim); Munoz v. Orr, 200 F.3d 291, 304 (5th Cir. 2000) ("[W]here a
promotion system uses tightly integrated and overlapping criteria, it may be difficult as a practical
matter for plaintiffs to isolate the particular step responsible for observed discrimination.").
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such as the Age Discrimination in Employment Act"' (ADEA). This path-
dependent application of the specific practice requirement to sex, age, and
disability discrimination allowed courts to introduce additional limitations to
the scope of disparate impact theory.
A wide range of employer practices can have a disparate statistical effect
on a trait that is found disproportionately in protected groups such as women,
the elderly, and the disabled. To a difference-conscious court, the causal
connection between the protected group and the trait, and thus between the
employer's practice and its disparate impact, is often readily apparent, and
worthy of disparate impact protection. To a difference-blind court, the causal
connection between the minority group and the trait is often invisible or not
protected. In the United States, defendants have successfully argued that
certain employer actions do not constitute practices, but are legitimate
requirements of the job or background norms that are categorically immune to
disparate impact scrutiny. 137 Rigid attendance policies, 138strict probationary
requirements, 139 differential treatment of full-time and part-time workers,
14 °
and separate bargaining for female-dominated and male-dominated groups of
workers 141 are not understood as employment practices at all in the United
States.
Scholars have criticized this narrowing of antidiscrimination doctrine.
142
For example, Christine Jolls laments the artificial distinction between
136. See Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 241-43 (2005) (exporting both the disparate
impact theory and the specific practice requirement to age discrimination claims).
137. See, e.g., Dormeyer v. Comerica Bank-Ill., 223 F.3d 579, 583-84 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding
that the plaintiff was not fired because she violated any employer policy against pregnancy, but rather
because she violated a legitimate policy against absenteeism).
138. See, e.g., id.; Troupe v. May Dep't Stores Co., 20 F.3d 734, 737 (7th Cir. 1994).
139. See, e.g., Stout v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 282 F.3d 856, 861-62 (5th Cir. 2002) (holding
that the plaintiff did not establish that should would have been treated differently had she violated
employer's ninety-day probationary absenteeism policy for any reason other than pregnancy
complications, and therefore that she could not establish that the policy discriminated against pregnant
women).
140. See, e.g., llhardt v. Sara Lee Corp., 118 F.3d 1151, 1156-57 (7th Cir. 1997) (rejecting part-
time worker's Title VII claim because, inter alia, she could not identify a specific practice); see also
Payne v. Huntington Union Free Sch. Dist., 219 F. Supp. 2d 273, 281 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (holding that a
part-time, temporary employee must compare herself with other part-time, temporary employees);
Brown v. Super K-Mart, No. 98 C 3498, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9525, at *13 (N.D. I11. June 14, 1999)
(citing Ilhardt, 118 F.3d at 1155) (holding that full-time and part-time employees are not similarly
situated); LaRocco v. Nalco Chem. Co., No. 96 CV 3980, 1999 WL 199251, at *13 (N.D. 111. Mar. 30,
1999) (citing Ilardt, 118 F.3d at 1155) (holding that full time and part-time employees cannot be
compared); Schallop v. N.Y. State Dep't of Law, 20 F. Supp. 2d 384, 403 (N.D.N.Y. 1998)
("Comparing women working part-time with men working full-time provides no guidance because it is
impossible to discern from those statistics whether any disparity is based on gender or on part-time
status, a classification not protected."); EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 628 F. Supp. 1264, 1285 (N.D.
111. 1986) (holding that the disparate impact claim must fail because the EEOC "has not identified any
specific, facially neutral policy of Sears which disproportionately excludes women from the jobs at
issue"). But see Lovell v. BBNT Solutions, L.L.C., 295 F. Supp. 2d 611, 619 (E.D. Va. 2003) (holding
that a part-time plaintiff who worked three-quarters of the hours of a full-time comparator, and often
more, could be compared to full-time worker).
141. See, e.g., Beard v. Whitley County REMC, 656 F. Supp. 1461, 1469-71 (N.D. Ind. 1987)
(holding that an employer's reliance on market forces in setting wages cannot be labeled a "policy or
practice" because "reliance on the market is inherently job related and is a built-in form of business
judgment"), affd, 840 F.2d 405 (7th Cir. 1988).
142. See Selmi, supra note 69, at 703-05, for a review.
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antidiscrimination and accommodation.143 Michelle Travis rejects workplace
essentialism. 144 Michael Stein and Michael Waterstone critique the
individualist turn in the accommodation of disabilities and call for the
resurrection of group-based disparate impact claims.
145
How did U.S. law reach this point? And what might it have looked like
if sex, rather than race, had been the paradigmatic category? The following
paragraphs first track the narrowing of U.S. disparate impact doctrine and then
discuss EU cases to illustrate the different path that discrimination law could
have taken in the absence of a specific practice requirement in the United
States. EU law has evolved to the point where plaintiffs can very easily make
out a prima facie case. However, courts leave employers substantial leeway to
make out defenses to these claims. U.S. fears that, absent a specific practice
requirement, courts would be flooded with antidiscrimination suits forcing
employers to resort to quotas have not materialized. Instead, EU employers
must simply give serious consideration to alternative employment
arrangements, while U.S. employers are categorically shielded from having
"background" employment practices scrutinized at all.
1. The Specific Practice Requirement in Sex and Age
Discrimination in the United States
The specific practice requirement sometimes operates in similar ways in
race and sex discrimination cases. For example, opaque hiring channels can
harm diverse groups of outsiders. In Wards Cove, plaintiffs complained of
"nepotism, a rehire preference, a lack of objective hiring criteria" and
"separate hiring channels." 146 In Joe's Stone, plaintiffs complained about
word-of-mouth hiring, coupled with an employer's reputation for hiring men
only.147 In both cases, the specific practice requirement allowed employers to
continue to use these non-transparent hiring channels, because neither the
minority plaintiffs in Wards Cove nor the female plaintiffs in Joe's Stone
could demonstrate with sufficient particularity how the employers' hiring
practices caused statistical disparities.
The specific practice requirement can be even more burdensome to
plaintiffs outside the race discrimination context, because sex, age, and
disability often correlate with important features of the workplace
environment. U.S. courts have used the specific practice language to draw an
additional distinction between background workplace structures, which are
immune from scrutiny, and other employer choices, which plaintiffs may be
able to challenge. In contrast, EU courts have allowed plaintiffs to make prima
facie cases challenging a wider set of workplace structures and have asked
defendants to justify these structures as necessary to their businesses.
Difference-blindness and difference-consciousness help explain this
143. Christine M. Jolls, Antidiscrimination and Accommodation, 115 HARV. L. REv. 642, 648-
49(2001).
144. Michelle A. Travis, Recapturing the Transformative Potential of Employment
Discrimination Law, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 3, 36-46 (2005).
145. Stein & Waterstone, supra note 4, at 864-65.
146. Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 647-48 (1989).
147. EEOC v. Joe's Stone Crab, Inc., 220 F.3d 1263, 1268 (1 lth Cir. 2000).
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divergence; the more conscious of employee differences a court becomes, the
less willing it is to assume that any practice should be categorically permitted.
Dormeyer v. Comerica Bank-Illinois illustrates U.S. courts' approach in
the context of sex discrimination. 148 A female employee argued that a policy
of firing employees after a certain number of absences had a disparate impact
on pregnant workers. In the view of the court, however, she would fail to
make out a disparate impact prima facie case even "if it could be shown that
the policy weighed more heavily on pregnant employees than on nonpregnant
ones and that it was not justified by compelling considerations of business
need."' 149 This is because the court deemed policies discouraging absenteeism
generally legitimate, and declined to enter into an analysis of whether
particularly low thresholds could be understood to meet the specific practice
requirement. The court arrived at this conclusion by showing how the race
analogy failed to cover Ms. Dormeyer's situation. To a race-blind court, the
distinction between intentional and unintentional discrimination is
straightforward, and a race-blind court can in this way more easily limit
disparate impact theory to cases involving pretext. Thus, the Dormeyer court
argued that "[t]he concept of disparate impact was developed and is intended
for cases in which employers impose eligibility requirements that are not
really necessary for the job for which the applicant is being hired, such as
requiring that applicants for a job as a dishwasher have a high school
education."
150
Similarly, in Stout v. Baxter Healthcare Corp. a female employee
claimed that the employer's practice of firing employees who miss more than
three days had a disparate impact on pregnant employees, and thus violated
the Pregnancy Discrimination Act. 51 Although the court accepted the
argument that this policy was likely to have severely negative consequences
on pregnant women, it noted that "all job requirements, regardless of their
nature, affect 'all or substantially all pregnant women.
' ' ' 52
U.S. courts have also used the specific practice requirement to limit age
discrimination suits by rejecting claims against policies considered
fundamental to the workplace. For example, in Finnegan v. Trans World
Airlines, Inc., an employer decided to limit its costs by capping all employees'
vacation time at four weeks.153 Employees aged over forty years claimed that
the company's policy had a disparate impact on them, since they had accrued
more vacation time than younger employees. The Finnegan court accepted
that the practice likely had a disproportionate impact, since "virtually all
elements of a standard compensation package are positively correlated with
age." 154 However, it concluded that the plaintiffs were not challenging a
specific business practice, but rather "an unavoidable response to
adversity."' 155 The court emphasized that the plaintiffs had failed to make out a
148. 223 F.3d 579 (7th Cir. 2000).
149. Id. at 583.
150. Id.
151. 282 F.3d 856, 858-59 (5th Cir. 2002).
152. Id. at 861.
153. 967 F.2d 1161, 1162 (7th Cir. 1992).
154. Id. at 1164.
155. Id.
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disparate impact case on these facts; therefore, the defendants did not need a
business necessity defense. 156 Again, the Finnegan court used the lack of
analogy with certain race precedents to explain its reasoning. The policies
challenged in Griggs and Watson
were policies that had been adopted originally for discriminatory reasons and had not
been changed when the employer ceased deliberately discriminating-if he had; for
another way of looking at the disparate impact approach is that it is primarily intended to
lighten the plaintiffs heavy burden of proving intentional discrimination after employers
learned to cover their tracks.
157
It was not as easy to impute employer intent in Finnegan; therefore, the
plaintiffs lost.
Davidson v. Board of Governors of State Colleges & Universities for
Western Illinois University presents a similar pattern. A fifty-eight-year-old
professor challenged a university's compensation system as having a disparate
impact on older professors. Only professors who obtained higher offers from
other employers could get raises. Since younger professors typically were
more mobile, this likely had a disparate impact on older professors. Again, the
plaintiff was not able to make out a prima facie case of discrimination because
the practice he challenged was not understood to be a specific employment
practice, but rather, a reasonable employer response to market prices.1 59 In
contrast, the ECJ in Danfoss was willing to scrutinize whether mobility
requirements had a disparate impact on women.'
60
The Supreme Court affirmed this line of reasoning in Smith v. City of
Jackson.16 1 In Smith, a group of older police officers sued the City of Jackson,
alleging that its compensation package awarded larger raises to younger
officers. 162 While a four-Justice plurality held that disparate impact claims
were possible under the ADEA, the Court also exported the specific practice
requirement, observing that the plaintiffs had "done little more than point out
that the pay plan is relatively less generous to older workers than to younger
ones. They have not, as required by Wards Cove, identified any specific test,
requirement, or practice within the pay plan that has an adverse impact on
older workers."'63
156. Id. at 1165 ("We could accept the plaintiffs' approach to the extent of finding a disparate
impact, and then rule that the employer's business justification was compelling. But that would not be a
satisfactory approach. It would mean that every time an employer made an across-the-board cut in
wages or benefits he was prima facie violating the age discrimination law. Practices so tenuously related
to discrimination, so remote from the objectives of civil rights law, do not reach the prima facie
threshold.").
157. Id. at 1164.
158. 920 F.2d 441 (7th Cir. 1990).
159. Id. at 445-46; see also Abbott v. Fed. Forge, Inc., 912 F.2d 867 (6th Cir. 1990) (holding
that plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that employer's decision to avoid hiring from a closed plant caused a
statistical pattern in which individuals over forty years old were underrepresented).
160. Case 109/88, Handels- og Kontorfunktioneremes Forbund I Danmark v. Dansk
Arbejdsgiverforening, exparte Danfoss, 1989 E.C.R. 3199.
161. 544 U.S. 228 (2005).
162. Id. at 242.
163. Id. at 229. It seems that the particularity requirement falls even harsher on ADEA
plaintiffs than on Title VII plaintiffs. This is because the analogy was made to Wards Cove, rather than
to the Civil Rights Act of 1991, which contains a narrow exception to this requirement in section 42
U.S.C. §2000e-2(k)(l)(B)(i) (2006).
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2. The Absence of the Specific Practice Requirement in Sex and
Age Discrimination in the European Union
EU cases illustrate how disparate impact doctrine could have evolved in
the absence of the specific practice requirement. Once Enderby established
that employees did not need to identify a specific employment practice as the
cause of a statistical discrepancy, EU law was used to challenge fundamental
aspects of workplace design. For example, Hill and Stapleton challenged
employers' preferential treatment of employees who occupied a single
position, as compared to employees who shared positions. 164 Seymour-Smith
suggested that a two-year probationary period could be challenged if it was
found to have a disparate impact on women. 65 And while the ECJ is generally
willing to allow employers to treat seniority as a legitimate criterion on which
to base pay decisions, it has allowed for the occasional challenge of pay
classifications based on generalizations about experience. 166
The fact that employees in the European Union can more easily make
out prima facie cases does not automatically result in the reform of workplace
rules, as employers can justify their practices. However, by placing on
employers the burden of justifying their practices, EU law prompts them to at
least seriously consider employee requests for accommodation. This contrasts
sharply with U.S. disparate impact law, which insulates many employer
practices from disparate impact scrutiny. Because employer defenses often
involve fact-specific determinations, they are often discussed in detail at the
national court level rather than at the ECJ. To illustrate the impact of the EU
sex antidiscrimination paradigm in the workplace, the discussion below
briefly illustrates how it has been applied in the United Kingdom, a
jurisdiction not considered employee-friendly by EU standards.
U.K. employers faced with a female employee's request to work part-
time must make significant and sincere efforts to accommodate her. In Brown
v. McAlpine, 67 the Employment Appeal Tribunal dismissed an employee's
discrimination claims only after the employer's extensive job-sharing search
proved unfruitful. The employee had conceded that her position required full-
time coverage, 168 and had specified that she was only willing to work
Mondays, Tuesdays, and Wednesday mornings.1 69 The employer advertised
the position in various newspapers and on multiple occasions, and approached
an employment agency that confirmed the difficulty of arranging the job-
164. Case C-243/95, Hill v. Revenue Comm'rs, 1998 E.C.R. 1-3739, 1-3741 (opinion of
Advocate General Le Pergola).
165. Case C-167/97, The Queen v. Sec'y of State for Employment, ex parte Seymour-Smith,
1999 E.C.R. 1-623, 1-626 (opinion of Advocate General Cosmas).
166. Compare Case C-17/05, B.F. Cadman v. Health & Safety Executive, 2006 E.C.R. 1-9583,
1-9592 (opinion of Advocate General Maduro) (suggesting that employers can use length of service as a
criterion in pay decisions, without special justification), with Case C-1/95, Gerster v. Freistaat Bayern,
1997 E.C.R. 1-5253, 1-5255 (opinion of Advocate General La Pergola) (suggesting that length of service
and experience are not always correlated, and thus employers may sometimes need to justify their
compensation criteria in this regard), and Case C-184/89, Nimz v. Freie und Hansestadt Hamburg, 1991
E.C.R. 1-297, 1-308 to -313 (opinion of Advocate General Darmon) (same).
167. Brown v. McAlpine & Co Ltd, Appeal No. EATS/0009/05, 2005 WL 3322329,
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share. 170 Under very similar circumstances in Rosie Mitchell v. Scottish
Borders Council,17 1 a lower tribunal found the employer's efforts to find a
suitable job-share candidate half-hearted, and granted the discrimination
claim. Although the employers in that case had also interviewed candidates,
they simultaneously pushed the employee to either accept a lower-grade job as
a part-timer or remain full-time until a replacement came up. Similarly, a pilot
succeeded in requiring her employer, British Airways, to grant her a fifty
percent schedule, even though the airline already had a seventy-five percent
part-time schedule and other flexible arrangements in place. 172 British
Airways claimed that public safety and business organization reasons
necessitated that all pilots work a certain minimum number of hours.
173
How will this jurisprudence extend to the new prohibited grounds of
discrimination? It seems that employees will continue to have great ease in
making out a prima facie case with no specific practice requirement. While
several direct discrimination cases have already been heard by the ECJ on
grounds of age, 174 only one case involving disparate impact claims has been
decided, Bartsch.175 This case suggests that the lenient prima facie standards
of the sex discrimination cases will likely apply to age claims as well. After
Mr. Bartsch's death, his employer's pension fund denied survivor benefits to
his wife on the grounds that the terms of the retirement pension prohibited
payments to a widow or widower who was more than fifteen years younger
than the former employee. 176 The German court referring the case to the ECJ
found that the age-gap clause could give rise to a disparate impact age
discrimination claim "on the basis that the probability of an employee being
affected increases with his or her age."' 177 The ECJ, following the advice of
the Advocate General, dismissed Ms. Bartsch's claim on other grounds, since
the pension fund's violation occurred before the transposition deadline of the
directive, i.e., before the prohibition of age discrimination entered into force.
However, after explaining why this particular case likely failed on a
technicality, the Advocate General concluded that Ms. Bartsch would have
likely won on the merits of the claim. The reason for this, he argued, was an
analogy to the court's sex discrimination jurisprudence:
To read [the directive article prohibiting age discrimination] as applying only to absolute
ages ('the employer treats a 50-year-old less favourably than a 40-year-old'), would be to
170. Id. 13.
171. See Press Release, Equal Opportunities Comm'n Scotland, New Investigation into
Flexible and Part-Time Work (July 15, 2004) (on file with author).
172. British Airways pic v. Starmer, [2005] I.R.L.R. 862, 865, 872 (Employment App. Trib.)
(U.K.).
173. Id.
174. See Case C-388/07, The Queen, exparte Inc. Trs. of the Nat'l Council on Ageing (Age
Concern England) v. Sec'y of State for Bus., Enter. & Regulatory Reform (Heyday) (Mar. 5, 2009),
http://curia.europa.eu; Case C-411/05, Palacios de ]a Villa v. Cortefiel Servicios SA, 2007 E.C.R. I-
8531; Case C-144/04, Mangold v. Helm, 2005 E.C.R. 1-998 1.
175. Case C-427/06, Bartsch v. Bosch und Siemens Hausgerate (BSH) Altersffirsorge GmbH
(Sept. 23, 2008), http://curia.europa.eu.
176. Id.
177. Id. T 21 (opinion of Advocate General Sharpston).
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interpret the principle in that article narrowly. That is not the way in which the Court has
interpreted sex discrimination, or any fundamental Treaty-based freedom.'
78
Perhaps the clearest sign that sex-conscious precedents will make it
substantially easier for other groups to make out prima facie cases can be seen
in the new definition of disparate impact. EU law now allows plaintiffs to
challenge employer practices that have not yet harmed anyone based on
theories about how particular employment practices will have foreseeable
differential consequences for protected groups. 179 In contrast, U.S. disparate
impact doctrine offers plaintiffs substantially more limited protections.
Choices made at a critical juncture decades ago, in response to particular
understandings of sex and race respectively, help explain this divergence.
IV. CONNECTING DISPARATE IMPACT AND DISPARATE TREATMENT
DOCTRINES
Courts in the United States and the European Union reached a second
critical juncture when confronted with pregnancy discrimination claims. Prior
to these cases, the distinction between disparate impact and disparate
treatment claims was relatively clear in both jurisdictions: treatment claims
focused on discriminatory intent, while impact claims focused on
discriminatory consequences. However, in both the United States and the
European Union, courts found pregnancy discrimination claims challenging to
the treatment/impact dichotomy. In the course of answering questions about
pregnancy, U.S. courts reinforced the distinction between disparate treatment
and disparate impact, while EU courts began to break it down. I argue that
race-blindness shaped the position of U.S. decisionmakers, while sex-
consciousness shaped the ECJ's response.
I also argue that these doctrinal choices were subsequently extended to
other minorities' claims, and dramatically influenced the probability that
particular allegations would succeed. The ECJ's conflation of disparate impact
and disparate treatment liability has facilitated successes for plaintiffs who
make claims that courts consider group-typical, such as women who want to
balance family and work responsibilities. In 2008, these precedents allowed
for surprising victories in cases involving lesbian, gay, bisexual, and
transgender (LGBT) and immigrant rights.
However, the conflation of disparate impact and disparate treatment
claims in the European Union does not uniformly benefit plaintiffs. This
conflation has also expanded the scope for employer defenses to disparate
treatment claims. These defenses were first introduced in pregnancy
discrimination cases, and were recently extended to age and disability
discrimination case law. In contrast, in the United States, the strict distinction
between disparate treatment and disparate impact confines certain broad
employer defenses to disparate impact suits.' This pattern, in which certainplaintiffs benefit more from EU jurisprudence, while other plaintiffs benefit
178. Id. 103 (footnote omitted).
179. See Council Directive 2000/43, art. 2(2)(b), 2000 O.J. (L 180) 22, 24 (EC); Council
Directive 2000/78, art. 2(2)(b), 2000 O.J. (L 303) 16, 18 (EC).
180. See Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44,53-54 (2003).
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more from U.S. jurisprudence, is surprising and inconsistent with alternative
theories that attribute the divergence of EU and U.S. doctrine to broad cultural
differences.
A. Critical Junctures: Pregnancy Discrimination in the United States
and the European Union
In General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, the U.S. Supreme Court held that
pregnancy classifications should be analyzed under the disparate impact,
rather than the disparate treatment framework, because non-pregnant persons
could be either male or female. 181 The plaintiffs in Gilbert challenged an
otherwise comprehensive disability insurance plan that excluded pregnancy-
related disabilities. 182 Writing for the Court, Justice Rehnquist rejected the
argument that this exclusion constituted disparate treatment of women under
Title VII. He reasoned that "[t]he program divides potential recipients into
two groups-pregnant women and nonpregnant persons. While the first group
is exclusively female, the second includes members of both sexes."
18 3
Race-blindness likely influenced this decision. As Serena Mayeri argues,
because "discrimination against women did not resemble the prevailing
paradigm of racial injustice, many judges had difficulty" recognizing the
harm. 1The Gilbert standard, that disparate treatment prohibits classifications
only when they correlate perfectly with sex, reveals a strong form of
difference-blindness. It is difficult to imagine how any socially relevant trait
would be exactly coterminous with a protected status.
Gilbert was a controversial decision, resulting in five separate opinions.
Nevertheless, I argue that the influence of the race-blindness paradigm is clear
in the arguments of both liberal and conservative Justices. Justices
sympathetic to pregnant women's claims reasoned in ways that reinforced the
distinction between disparate impact and disparate treatment. More
specifically, all but one of the Justices in Gilbert implied that disparate
treatment claims require proof of discriminatory intent. Justices Blackmun and
Stewart's concurrences underline that classifications on the basis of pregnancy
are not facially discriminatory but could be challenged as having disparate
effects on women.'85 Justice Brennan's dissent, which Justice Marshall joined,
argues that the Gilbert plaintiffs should succeed on both their disparate impact
and their disparate treatment claims. 186 However, discriminatory intent is
central to this disparate treatment argument; they emphasize that "General
Electric's discriminatory attitude toward women was a motivating factor in its
policy.' 1 7 Only Justice Stevens argued, in his dissent, that differential
181. 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
182. Id.
183. Id. at 135 (citing Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 496-97 (1974)).
184. See Mayeri, supra note 6, at 1811 (discussing the equal protection challenge to the
exclusion of pregnancy claims from an otherwise comprehensive insurance plan in Geduldig, 417 U.S.
484).
185. See Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 146 (Stewart, J., concurring); id. (Blackmun, J., concurring).
186. Id. at 148-60 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (outlining the disparate treatment claim in Part 11,
and the disparate impact claim in Part 111).
187. Id. at 149-50 (quoting Gilbert v. Gen. Elec. Co., 375 F. Supp. 367, 383 (E.D. Va. 1974)).
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treatment on the grounds of pregnancy is facially discriminatory because "it is
the capacity to become pregnant which primarily differentiates the female
from the male. ' 88
In contrast, the ECJ, influenced by sex-consciousness, took a position
that was more protective of pregnant women than that of any U.S. Justice. In
Dekker v. Stichting Vormingscentrum voor Jong Volwassenen, the ECJ held
that pregnancy classifications constituted disparate treatment on the grounds
of sex because "only women can be refused employment on grounds of
pregnancy."' 189 The Dekker opinion extends greater protections to pregnant
women than Justice Stevens's opinion in Gilbert might have. This is because
the ECJ held that an employer could not refuse to hire a pregnant woman even
in circumstances where the employer could refuse employment to a man with
a foreseeable temporary disability. 9
0
In the United States, Congress responded to Gilbert by enacting the
Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, which defined sex discrimination
to include pregnancy discrimination claims.1 91 Nonetheless, these early
pregnancy cases constitute critical junctures for the evolution of
discrimination doctrine because Gilbert reinforced distinctions between
disparate impact and disparate treatment claims, while Dekker began to break
them down. A difference-blind framework treats discrimination on the basis
of any employee trait under the disparate impact framework without
distinguishing between traits that are incidentally connected to a protected
status and traits that are intrinsically linked to it. A difference-conscious
framework elevates connections between a protected status and certain traits,
and uses the disparate treatment framework to analyze these.
How courts distinguish intrinsic connections from incidental ones is
critical; to date, the ECJ has applied the disparate treatment framework to
traits that are not merely highly correlated with a protected status, but also
causally connected. 92 The ECJ recently evaluated the link between immigrant
status and ethnic origin, and the link between marital status and sexual
orientation. Employing a difference-conscious paradigm, the ECJ held that the
unfavorable treatment of immigrants can be challenged as disparate treatment
on the grounds of ethnic origin. It also held that the unfavorable treatment of
unmarried couples can be challenged as disparate treatment on the grounds of
sexual orientation. In contrast, such claims are typically analyzed under the
disparate impact framework in the United States, and often fail.
Legislatures in both the United States and Europe could redefine
employment discrimination laws to cover immigrants explicitly, and to grant
the same benefits to same-sex and opposite-sex couples, just as the U.S.
Congress amended Title VII to include pregnancy claims. Until this happens,
188. Id. at 162 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
189. Case C-177/88, Dekker v. Stichting Vormingscentrum voor Jong Volwassenen (VJV-
Centrum) Plus, 1990 E.C.R. 1-3941, 1-3973.
190. Id. at 1-3973.
191. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)-(k) (2006).
192. See also Deborah A. Ramirez, Excluded Voices: The Disenfranchisement of Ethnic
Groups from Jury Service, 1993 Wis. L. REv. 761, 763 n.8 (discussing the "super-correlat[ion]" in the
relationship between ethnicity and language in the case of Hispanic minorities in related terms).
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the framework courts choose to analyze these claims substantially influences
their probability of success.
However, the conflation of disparate impact and disparate treatment
because of difference consciousness does not systematically favor plaintiffs,
as Section IV.C explains. The next major EU pregnancy discrimination case,
Webb v. EMO Air Cargo (UK) Ltd, clarified the holding in Dekker by
explicitly finding that an employer could not dismiss a pregnant female
employee even in cases where it would have dismissed a male employee who
required a leave of absence for medical reasons.' 93 Revealing a strong form of
difference-consciousness, the ECJ argued that "pregnancy is not in any way
comparable with a pathological condition" but is nonetheless covered by sex-
discrimination prohibitions. 194 At the same time, Webb introduced the
possibility of broad defenses, characteristic of disparate impact claims, to
disparate treatment claims.
B. How Sex and Race Precedents Shape Other Plaintiffs' Claims
1. Sexual Orientation Claims
A large number of U.S. states and EU member states prohibit
employment discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, but at the same
time forbid gay marriage. 195 Employers in these jurisdictions face a
conundrum: how should they treat unmarried same-sex couples in committed
relationships? Must employers grant same-sex domestic partners the same
benefits they offer married couples? Are employers free to design their benefit
packages as they see fit? Or might some employers, notably public employers,
be prohibited from offering domestic partner benefits even if they would
prefer to do so?
I argue that courts' decisions on these highly politicized issues depend in
large part on the precedents they face, precedents decided decades earlier to
address very different situations. More specifically, sex-conscious precedents
made it substantially easier for the ECJ to reach a plaintiff-friendly ruling in
its first case exploring the prohibition of discrimination on the grounds of
sexual orientation.' 96 In its 2008 Maruko v. Versorgungsanstalt der deutschen
Biihnen ruling, the ECJ held that where national law places life partners and
spouses in a comparable situation, offering survivors' benefits to married
spouses but not to domestic partners constitutes disparate treatment on the
193. Case C-32/93, Webb v. EMO Air Cargo (UK) Ltd, 1994 E.C.R. 1-3567.
194. Id. at 1-3587.
195. As of September 2, 2009, twenty-one U.S. states have laws that prohibit workplace
discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation. See Human Rights Campaign, Statewide
Employment Laws & Policies (Sept. 2, 2009), http://www.hrc.org/documents/EmploymentLaws-and
Policies.pdf. Similarly, across the European Union, employers cannot discriminate on the grounds of
sexual orientation. However, only a handful of U.S. states and EU member states permit same-sex
couples to marry.
196. Case C-267/06, Maruko v. Versorgungsanstalt der deutschen Bihnen, 2008 E.C.R. 1-1757.
Maruko was the first ECJ case calling for an interpretation of the EU prohibition on discrimination on
the grounds of sexual orientation. Earlier challenges under the EU prohibition on sex discrimination had
failed. See Case C-249/96, Grant v. Sw. Trains Ltd, 1998 E.C.R. 1-621, 1-652; see also Joined Cases C-
122/99 P & C-125/99 P, D & Kingdom of Swed. v. Council, 2001 E.C.R. 1-4319, 1-4347, 1-4356. These
earlier failures suggest that the ECJ was not exceptionally eager to extend benefits to gay partners.
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grounds of sexual orientation. 197 If and when federal law prohibits
employment discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, race-blind
precedents are likely to make it much harder for U.S. courts to reach similarly
broad conclusions.198
U.S. and EU courts face an important choice: they can analyze domestic
partner benefits using the disparate impact or the disparate treatment
framework. Because only committed gay couples cannot benefit from
marriage, courts could analyze the denial of spousal benefits as disparate
treatment on the grounds of sexual orientation. Alternatively, because the
denial of benefits to unmarried couples treats unmarried straight and gay
couples alike, courts could reject the disparate treatment argument and use the
disparate impact framework. Analysis under the disparate treatment
framework increases the probability of plaintiff success. 
199
In Maruko, the ECJ held that the restriction of survivors' benefits to
married spouses amounted to disparate treatment of gay partners in committed
life partnerships.2 0 The plaintiff2"1 and some commentators 20 2 have argued
that the Maruko facts could give rise to a claim of disparate treatment by
analogy to the Court's earlier decisions on pregnancy. In Dekker, the ECJ had
held that "only women can be refused employment on grounds of pregnancy
and such a refusal therefore constitutes direct discrimination on grounds of
sex."2°3 A parallel argument that in Germany, only same-sex partners in a
relationship fundamentally equivalent to marriage could be excluded from
survivors benefits, likely carried the day in Maruko. Gay rights advocates
197. Case C-267/06, Maruko, 2008 E.C.R. at 1-1778.
198. President Obama has pledged to fight workplace discrimination by helping to enact the
Employment Non-Discrimination Act (ENDA), a proposed federal statute that would prohibit
discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation. See The White House, Civil Rights,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/issues/civil-rights (last visited Nov. 9, 2009). For a more extensive
description of ENDA, and past failures and successes in Congress, see Human Rights Campaign,
Employment Non-Discrimination Act, http://www.hrc.org/laws and elections/enda.asp (last visited
Nov. 9, 2009). See also Jennifer S. Hendricks, Instead of ENDA, A Course Correction for Title VII, 103
Nw. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 209, 209 (2008), http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/
2008/43 ("The LGBT community may soon win a legal victory that has been decades in the making:
passage of the Employment Non-Discrimination Act."); National Gay and Lesbian Task Force,
Narrative: The Task Force's Commitment to Ending Discrimination Against Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and
Transgender Americans Has a Long History, http://www.thetaskforce.org/issues/nondiscimination/
narrative (last visited Nov. 16, 2009).
199. Moreover, it is likely that in the United States ENDA will only allow for disparate
treatment claims, altogether eliminating the possibility that a disparate impact challenge could succeed.
Both the most recent version of ENDA, which won House approval in November 2007, and prior
versions specifically foreclose disparate impact claims. See Employee Non-Discrimination Act of 2007,
H.R. 3685, 110th Cong., 153 CONG. REc. 13228, 13252 (2007); see also Employment Non-
Discrimination Act of 2003, S. 1705, 108th Cong. § 4(f) (2003); Employment Non-Discrimination Act
of 2001, S. 1284, 107th Cong. § 4(f) (2001); Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2001, H.R. 2692,
107th Cong. § 4(f) (2001); Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 1994, H.R. 4636, 103d Cong.
(1994).
200. Case C-267/06, Maruko, 2008 E.C.R. at 1-1757.
201. See Helmut Graupner, The Case Tadao Maruko: Equal Rights to Pension Benefits?: Legal
Implications of the Maruko Judgment (Oct. 31, 2008), http://www.graupner.at/documents/
Graupner-081031 .ppt. Helmut Graupner was counsel in the Maruko case.
202. See, e.g., C. WAALDIJK & MATTEO BONtNI-BARALDI, SEXUAL ORIENTATION
DISCRIMINATION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION: NATIONAL LAWS AND THE EMPLOYMENT EQUALITY
DIRECTIVE 115 (2006).
203. Case C-177/88, Dekker v. Stichting Vorminsgscentrum Voor Jonge Volwassen (VJV-
Centrum) Plus, 1990 E.C.R. 1-3941, 1-3973.
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celebrated Maruko and highlighted the significance of the ECJ's usage of the
disparate treatment rather than the disparate impact framework.2 °4
Sex discrimination precedents were critical to the Maruko holding in
other respects. The EU Framework Directive specifies that it "is without
prejudice to national laws on marital status and the benefits dependent
thereon." 20 5 Absent sex discrimination precedents, the ECJ could have easily
rejected Mr. Maruko's claim for partner benefits on the grounds that the
benefits of marriage are set by EU member states and that marital status
discrimination is not per se prohibited under EU law. However, EU law has
long recognized that marital status can intersect with sex discrimination in
pernicious ways. As early as 1976, a directive prohibited sex discrimination
that takes the form of marital or family status discrimination.20 6 In later cases,
the ECJ ruled that a national law setting preconditions that effectively
prohibited transsexuals from marriage, and thus from survivors' benefits,
violated the European sex nondiscrimination principles. 207 Following this
body of law, the Court in Maruko concluded that it had jurisdiction over
partner benefits claims that revealed potential discrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation.
20 8
It seems unlikely, however, that U.S. federal courts would give the
prohibition of discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation similarly
204. See, e.g., Renata Goldirova, Same-Sex Couples Score Victory on Pension Rights,
EUOBSERVER.COM, Oct. 24, 2008, http://euobserver.com/?aid=25902 (quoting Tadao Maruko's lawyer,
Helmut Graupner, who suggested that "[t]he next case may be one of indirect discrimination, from a
country that excludes same-sex partners from the rights and obligations of marriage"); Matthew Vella, A
Gay Rights Ruling That's Not Straight to the Point, MALTA TODAY, May 4, 2008,
http://www.maltatoday.com.mt/2008/05/04/n8.html (quoting Europe Region of the International Gay
and Lesbian Association (ILGA-Europe) policy officer Silvan Agius, who predicted that the fact that
Maruko's case was decided as a direct discrimination case left the possibility open for a gay couple from
a country that did not recognize civil unions to bring a disparate impact claim).
205. See Council Directive 2000/78, recital 22, 2000 O.J. (L 303) 16, 17 (EC).
206. Council Directive 76/207, On the Implementation of the Principle of Equal Treatment for
Men and Women, art. 2, 1976 O.J. (L 39) 40,40 (EC).
207. See Case C-1 17/01, K.B. v. Nat'l Health Serv. Pensions Agency, 2004 E.C.R. 1-541, 1-551
to -552 (holding that transsexuals could be entitled to survivors' benefits, despite a U.K. law setting
preconditions which effectively prohibited transsexuals from marriage, and thus from survivors'
benefits).
208. Case C-267/06, Maruko v. Versorgungsanstalt der deutschen Buhnen, 2008 E.C.R. 1-1757,
1-1807. Defendants in Maruko raised an additional claim related to the intersection of marriage and
employment discrimination law. They claimed that pension benefits accruing to an employee's partner
did not constitute pay; survivors' benefits do not accrue to the employee and derive from the marriage
relationship. Id. at 1-1804 to -1805. However, by the time of the Maruko decision in 2008, sex
precedents all but foreclosed the option of excluding partner benefits from the definition of pay, and thus
from judicial scrutiny. By then, EU law on sex discrimination clearly specified that "a survivor's
pension provided for under an occupational pension scheme, set up under a collective agreement, falls
within the scope of Article 141 EC," despite the fact that, by definition, it accrues to the survivor rather
than to the employee. Id. at 1-1807. A long line of cases that viewed women in the context of their
marital relationships had provided a broad definition of pay that the ECJ eventually applied across
protected groups in antidiscrimination law. The ECJ explicitly cited to these cases in Maruko. Id. at
1-1806 to -1807. It seems possible that if the ECJ had developed case law based on race, the question of
pay accruing to partners would not have arisen as prominently as it did in sex discrimination cases,
because marriage would be less central to race discrimination claims. Indeed, a California appellate
court has used the distinction between benefits accruing to an employee, and benefits accruing to an
employee's partner, to avoid granting benefits to gay partners under an executive order prohibiting any
acts of discrimination on the basis of sexual preference. See Hinman v. Dep't of Pers. Admin., 213 Cal.
Rptr. 410, 419-20 (Ct. App. 1985).
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broad scope. While there is substantial variation in how U.S. courts have
interpreted state and local laws in evaluating claims concerning domestic
partner benefits, this variation is not necessarily encouraging to the LGBT
community. Even when state law prohibits discrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation, many courts have allowed employers to deny same-sex
partners benefits. 209 Some courts have required that employers provide
comparable benefits, but used disparate impact theory to reach this result.
210
Tanner v. Oregon Health Sciences University was the first major case in
which a public employer's failure to provide health and life insurance benefits
to same-sex partners was found to be discriminatory. 211 While the case
interpreted an Oregon constitutional provision rather than Title VII, the
Tanner court clarified that it was using a disparate impact rather than a
disparate treatment framework.212 The court found that "OHSU's practice of
denying insurance benefits to unmarried domestic partners, while facially
neutral as to homosexual couples, effectively screens out 100 percent of them
from obtaining full coverage for both partners."' 2 13 The Tanner decision
illustrates that even a liberal court supportive of extending benefits to same-
sex partners might see disparate impact theory as the only available doctrinal
tool.
These precedents suggest that even if the Employment Non-
Discrimination Act is passed, courts are unlikely to interpret it as requiring
employers to provide equivalent benefits to same- and opposite-sex couples.
The strong distinction between disparate treatment and disparate impact
claims evident in U.S. law prohibiting discrimination on the grounds of race,
ethnic origin, sex, and age is likely to be extended to sexual orientation claims
as well. The comparison with Europe suggests that a different historical
trajectory might have resulted in the rapid extension of domestic partner
benefits through judicial interpretation.
2. Immigrants' Claims
Both U.S. statutes and EU directives now contain broad prohibitions
against race and national origin discrimination, but offer much more limited
protections to persons who suffer discrimination on account of their
209. See, e.g., Hinman, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 419-20 (holding that the denial of dental care
coverage to the same-sex partner of a state employee did not violate the state constitution or an
executive order prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual preference); Ross v. Denver Dep't of
Health & Hosps., 883 P.2d 516, 521 (Colo. Ct. App. 1994) (holding that the denial of healthcare
coverage to same-sex partner of state employee does not discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation,
since all similarly situated unmarried employees are treated alike); Phillips v. Wis. Pers. Comm'n, 482
N.W.2d 121, 127 (Wis. Ct. App. 1992) (same).
210. See Tanner v. Or. Health Sci. Univ., 971 P.2d 435, 443 (Or. Ct. App. 1998); Grievance of
B.M. et al., 16 V.L.R.B. 207, 220 (1993) (holding that employer definition of dependents had an adverse
impact on gay employees); see also Levin v. Yeshiva Univ., 754 N.E.2d 1099, 1106 (N.Y. 2001)
(successful disparate impact challenge). But see Alaska Civil Liberties Union v. State, 122 P.3d 781,
788-89 (Alaska 2005) (holding that the provision of employment benefits to "spouses" but not to
domestic partners of employees who cannot marry their same-sex partners violates the equal protection
clause of the Alaska state constitution under a disparate treatment theory).
211. 971 P.2d at 435.
212. Id. at 443.
213. Id.
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citizenship. However, in practice, citizenship and national origin
discrimination can overlap to a substantial degree. Courts have a choice of
addressing this overlap under the disparate impact framework, or the disparate
treatment framework. In the United States, race-blindness has led courts to
address discrimination based on citizenship under the disparate impact
framework, which substantially limits the probability of plaintiff success. The
European Union and its member states are not considered particularly
welcoming to immigrants.2t 4 However, in its first case of race and ethnic
origin discrimination, the 2008 case Centrum voor gelijkheid van kansen en
voor racismebestrijding v. Firma Feryn, the ECJ held that an employer's
statement that he would not recruit immigrants amounted to disparate
treatment on the grounds of racial or national origin. 215 The conflation of
disparate treatment and impact doctrines in early pregnancy discrimination
cases likely led to substantial benefits for immigrants.
Although the United States is generally considered to be substantially
friendlier toward immigrants than the European Union, 216 the U.S. courts'
application of disparate impact doctrine to claims of nationality discrimination
has limited plaintiffs' chances of success. Both EU directives and Title VII
distinguish between discrimination on the grounds of national origin or race,
which is prohibited, and discrimination on the grounds of citizenship, which is
permitted.217 In Espinoza v. Farah Manufacturing Co., the Supreme Court
drew a clear distinction between national origin and citizenship
discrimination.218 While the Espinoza plaintiffs lost, the Supreme Court left
open the possibility that other employees could argue that employers'
distinctions on the basis of citizenship were pretextual, or that they had a
disparate impact on people of a particular national origin. 219 However,
plaintiffs have had difficulty in making out successful prima facie disparate
impact cases, even when citizenship and national origin discrimination are
intimately linked. For example, in MacNamara v. Korean Air Lines, a treaty
provision allowing Korean companies to favor Korean citizens in filling
executive positions was found not to violate Title VII, even though the tight
214. For an extensive analysis of attitudes toward immigrants and European migration policy,
see generally ANDREW GEDDES, IMMIGRATION AND EUROPEAN INTEGRATION: TOWARDS FORTRESS
EUROPE? (2001). See also Thomas J. Archdeacon, Reflections on Immigration to Europe in Light of U.S.
Immigration History, 26 INT'L MIGRATION REv. 525, 525 (1992); Edwin Harwood, American Public
Opinion and U.S. Immigration Policy, 487 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 201, 202 (1986).
215. See Case C-54/07, Centrum voor gelijkheid van kansen en voor racismebestrijding v.
Firma Feryn NV (July 10, 2008), http://curia.europa.eu.
216. See, e.g., Archdeacon, supra note 214, at 525; Harwood, supra note 214, at 202.
217. While Title Vii does not prohibit discrimination on the basis of citizenship, the
Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359, protects U.S. citizens
and some categories of noncitizens pursuing naturalization from nationality discrimination. However,
not only is this prohibition limited in scope to certain categories of workers who already have or are able
and willing to pursue U.S. citizenship, but it is also subject to several exceptions, such as the possibility
that employers may prefer citizens to aliens when the two are equally qualified. EU law, as described
below, also contains separate protections for citizens of EU member states, as well as for long-term
residents.
218. 414 U.S. 86 (1973).
219. Id. at 92 ("Certainly Tit. VII prohibits discrimination on the basis of citizenship whenever
it has the purpose or effect of discriminating on the basis of national origin.").
Path Dependence in Discrimination Law
connection between Korean citizenship and Korean national origin effectively
excluded persons of other national origins from consideration.
220
Surprisingly, citizenship discrimination claims might be more likely to
succeed in the European Union, now that the ECJ has treated employers'
practices against immigrants as disparate treatment on the basis of race or
national origin, as Feryn illustrates. In this case, the Centrum voor gelijkheid
van kansen en voor racismebestrijding (CGKR), the Belgian public body for
the promotion of equal treatment, brought proceedings before Belgian labor
courts alleging that Feryn, a company that sold and installed sectional doors,
had a discriminatory recruitment policy. 221 The CGKR based its allegations on
public statements by the director of Feryn that, while his business was seeking
installers, it could not hire immigrants because of customer preferences.
22
The first question presented to the ECJ was whether a specific statement made
by Mr. Feryn constituted discrimination, in the absence of a particular
applicant who experienced discrimination. The ECJ held that such a public
statement is discriminatory because it likely dissuades qualified candidates
from applying for jobs.223
The ECJ did not address directly the question of why employer
statements about immigrants can be equated to statements about racial or
national origin. This is particularly striking since member states have included
in the relevant directive provisions that explicitly allow employers to treat
citizens and non-citizens differently. 224 Many commentators have discussed
and criticized this broad exclusion of nationality discrimination claims from
the directive. 225 EU legislators likely envisioned a more limited set of
220. 863 F.2d 1135, 1146-47 (3d Cir. 1988); see also Damron v. Yellow Freight Sys., 188 F.3d
506 (6th Cir. 1999) (unpublished table decision) (affirming lower court's rejection of a discrimination
claim based on plaintiff's U.S. citizenship); Weeks v. Samsung Heavy Indus. Co., 126 F.3d 926, 935
(7th Cir. 1997) (distinguishing between citizenship and national origin discrimination in another
challenge of treaty provisions allowing Korea and the United States to prefer their own citizens in filling
executive positions); Vasilescu v. Black & Veatch Pritchard, Inc., 155 F. Supp. 2d 1285, 1293 (D. Kan.
2001) (refusing to consider "comments relating to plaintiff's Canadian citizenship" in a suit alleging
discrimination on the grounds of national origin, because Title VII does not cover citizenship).
221. See Case C-54/07, Centrum voor gelijkheid van kansen en voor racismebestrijding v.
Firma Feryn NV, para. 15 (July 10, 2008), http://curia.europa.eu.
222. Id. para. 16. More specifically, on April 28, 2005, Mr. Feryn appeared on Belgian national
television and stated: "[W]e have many of our representatives visiting customers .... Everyone is
installing alarm systems and these days everyone is obviously very scared. It is not just immigrants who
break in. I won't say that, I'm not a racist. Belgians break into people's houses just as much. But people
are obviously scared. So people often say: 'no immigrants.' . . . I must comply with my customers'
requirements." Id. para. 4 (opinion of Advocate General Maduro).
223. Id. para. 28 (judgment).
224. See Council Directive 2000/43, Implementing the Principle of Equal Treatment Between
Persons Irrespective of Racial or Ethnic Origin, art. 3, 2000 O.J. (L 180) 22, 24 (EC). Article 3(2) states
that "[tihis Directive does not cover difference of treatment based on nationality and is without prejudice
to provisions and conditions relating.., to any treatment which arises from the legal status of the third-
country nationals and stateless persons concerned." Id. art. 3(2), at 24.
225. See, e.g., ELLIS, supra note 68, at 289 ("[T]he provision may well open the door to what
are actually examples of racial discrimination being excused on the basis of nationality."); Femne
Brennan, The Race Directive: Recycling Racial Inequality, 5 CAMBRIDGE Y.B. EUR. LEGAL STUD. 311
(2002-2003); Christopher Brown, The Race Directive: Towards Equality for All the Peoples of Europe?,
21 Y.B. EUR. L. 195 (2001-2002); Anthony Lester Lord, New European Equality Measures, 2000 PUB.
L. 562, 565 (understanding this exception as incompatible with the protection of human rights); Helen
Meenan, Introduction to EQUALITY LAW IN AN ENLARGED EUROPEAN UNION: UNDERSTANDING THE
ARTICLE 13 DIRECTIVES 3, 26-27 (Helen Meenan ed., 2007); Paul Skidmore, EC Framework Directive
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protections for immigrants, as a separate directive protects from
discrimination only immigrants who are also long-term residents.
226
Advocate General Maduro's opinion suggests that he was aware of the
challenge of conflating immigrant status and national origin, and sought to
elide it. Maduro's opinion relies heavily on disputed testimony that Mr. Feryn
stated to a Belgian newspaper reporter that "'we aren't looking for
Moroccans.' 227 Even if this disputed evidence were true, it is not clear why a
statement about "Moroccans" would be a clear reference to national origin
rather than nationality.
Earlier pregnancy discrimination cases help explain why the ECJ
perceived such statements as disparate treatment of persons of different
national origin. Because many countries around the world award citizenship
on the basis of parentage, citizenship and ethnic origin are often intricately
connected. Moroccan citizenship status and Moroccan ethnic origin, for
example, are likely closely and causally linked. Since discrimination against
pregnant persons is disparate treatment on the grounds of sex, so
discrimination against immigrants is disparate treatment on the grounds of
ethnic origin. Viewed in this light, the ECJ's decision in Feryn presents clear
parallels to Dekker, which found disparate treatment on the basis of a trait
intrinsically interwoven with the protected group.
C. Implications for Defendants
The conflation of disparate treatment and disparate impact claims in the
European Union has not been an unmitigated good for plaintiffs. While this
conflation has allowed European workers to challenge a wide range of
employer practices more easily, it has also expanded the scope for employer
defenses to disparate treatment claims.
Initially, in both the United States and the European Union, a limited
number of narrow defenses were available in disparate treatment cases.
Relatively broad defenses, such as "business necessity" were only available
228when plaintiffs alleged disparate impact. In the United States, treatment and
impact claims remain separate, and thus these broad defenses are confined to
disparate impact cases.
on Equal Treatment in Employment: Towards a Comprehensive Community Anti-Discrimination
Policy?, 30 INDUS. L.J. 1 (2001); EUROPEAN NETWORK AGAINST RACISM, COUNCIL DIRECTIVE
IMPLEMENTING THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUAL TREATMENT BETWEEN PERSONS IRRESPECTIVE OF RACIAL OR
ETHNIC ORIGIN, 2000/43/EC 4 (2005), http://cms.horus.be/files/99935/MediaArchive/pdf/OKT05
_ENAR -RD_5yrReport.pdf (suggesting that overlapping sources of discrimination are not adequately
addressed).
226. Council Directive 2003/109, Concerning the Status of Third-Country Nationals Who Are
Long-Term Residents, 2004 O.J. (L 16) 44 (EC). "Long-term residents shall enjoy equal treatment with
nationals as regards: (a) access to employment and self-employed activity, provided such activities do
not entail even occasional involvement in the exercise of public authority, and conditions of
employment and working conditions, including conditions regarding dismissal and remuneration." Id.
art. I I(l)(a), at 49.
227. Case C-54/07, Feryn, para. 3 (opinion of Advocate General Maduro).
228. See, e.g., Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44, 54 (2003) ("[A] business necessity
defense ... pertain[s] to disparate-impact claims but not disparate-treatment claims." (citing Hernandez
v. Hughes Missile Sys. Co., 298 F.3d 1030, 1036-37 & n.19 (9th Cir. 2002)).
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In contrast, in the European Union, a broad set of defenses once reserved
for disparate impact claims is becoming available in both impact and
treatment cases. Judges' views about women's biological and social roles both
facilitated plaintiffs' prima facie cases, and at the same time broadened the
scope for employer defenses. In Webb v. EMO Air Cargo (UK) Ltd229 and
Birds Eye Walls Ltd v. Roberts,23 ° the ECJ imported defenses previously
applicable only to disparate impact into its disparate treatment jurisprudence
on sex discrimination. When age and disability discrimination were later
prohibited by EU law, this broad set of defenses began to be extended to the
new protected groups. As a consequence of sex-conscious precedents, the ECJ
scope for defenses to disparate treatment on the grounds of age and disability
had become much broader than it would have been under race-blind
precedents, as the comparison with U.S. doctrine shows.
1. Defenses to Discrimination Claims in the United States and
the European Union
In both U.S. and EU law, initially, a very limited set of enumerated
defenses was available to disparate treatment claims. In the United States,
employers who intentionally treat blacks and whites differently have no
affirmative defense. Employers who intentionally treat women and men
differently can invoke a narrow affirmative defense-the bona fide
occupational qualification defense. In contrast, a much broader set of defenses
is available for disparate impact claims. In U.S. doctrine, if the employee has
made out a prima facie disparate impact case-that is, shown that a specific
practice has a substantial negative effect on a particular group 231 -the
employer may defend the practice by showing that it is "job related for the
position in question and consistent with business necessity." 232 The plaintiff
can challenge the business necessity claim by showing that an effective
alternative practice would have lesser impact.
233
Business necessity is a relatively broad affirmative defense. Michael
Selmi's study of the success and failure of disparate impact claims in the
United States suggests that as an empirical matter, when employers invoke
business necessity, "courts readily accept most proffered justifications. 23 4 A
similar defense is available in the European Union: an employer can defend a
practice with a disparate impact by showing that the challenged practice "is
objectively justified by a legitimate aim and the means of achieving that aim
are appropriate and necessary." 235 EU courts also accept a relatively broad
range of employer contentions. For example, employers' desires to encourage
229. Case C-32/93, Webb v. EMO Air Cargo (UK) Ltd, 1994 E.C.R. 1-3567.
230. Case C-132/92, Birds Eye Walls Ltd v. Roberts, 1993 E.C.R. 1-5579.
231. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(l)(A)(i) (2006).
232. Id. The same defense is available for disability. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.15(c) (2008). For age
discrimination claims, the employer only needs to show that the practice is "reasonable." 29 U.S.C. §
623(0(1).
233. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(ii).
234. Selmi, supra note 69, at 705-06.
235. Council Directive 2000/43, art. 2(b), 2000 O.J. (L 180) 22, 24 (EC) (race); Council
Directive 78/2000, art. 2(2)(b)(i), 2000 O.J. (L 180) 16, 17 (EC) (age, disability, orientation, religion);
see also Council Directive 2006/54, art. 2(1)(b), 2006 O.J. (L 204) 23, 26 (EC) (sex).
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training,236 employers' desires to encourage full-time work,237 and employers'
efforts to attract workers who are in short supply have all been deemed
legitimate justifications.
U.S. law has kept disparate impact and disparate treatment theories
separate, and thus the broad range of business necessity defenses are limited
to disparate impact claims. In contrast, in the European Union, Dekker, the
pregnancy case that conflated disparate treatment and disparate impact, also
contained the seeds of the extension of broad defenses to disparate treatment.
As described above, Dekker established that discrimination on the grounds of
pregnancy constituted disparate treatment on the grounds of sex.238 In Dekker,
the ECJ also discussed the cost-saving justification proposed by Ms. Dekker's
employer. The ECJ found that cost-saving was not a sufficient justification for
disparate treatment of pregnant women, 239 as it would not have been in
disparate impact cases. Eliminating one possible justification, however,
prompted employers to investigate whether other justifications to sex
disparate treatment claims would be possible.
Webb, the next major pregnancy discrimination case, grew out of this
context. In that case, the ECJ was asked whether an employer could fire a
pregnant woman on the grounds that she could not perform the main task for
which she was hired-replacing another woman who was on maternity leave.
The Commission explicitly argued that disparate treatment on the grounds of
sex could be justified in some circumstances, as did the United Kingdom.
240
The Court held for Mrs. Webb. However, rather than finding categorically that
disparate treatment on the grounds of sex could never be justified, the ECJ
explained why the justification put forth by this employer was not
acceptable. 241 In this regard, the Webb Court highlighted that Mrs. Webb's
contract was for an indefinite period, while the absence would be "purely
temporary. ,242 This invited many commentators to expect a different holding
in the case of employees on fixed-term contracts.
243
The issue of justification of disparate treatment on the grounds of sex
was raised again in Birds Eye Walls. In that case, an employer, Birds Eye
Walls, gave different occupational pension benefits to men and women
236. Case C-109/88, Handels- og Kontorfunktionzeremes Forbund I Danmark v. Dansk
Arbejdsgiverforening, exparte Danfoss, 1989 E.C.R. 3199, 3207.
237. See Case 170/84, Bilka-Kaufhaus GmbH v. Weber von Hartz, 1986 E.C.R. 1607, 1630-31.
238. Case C-177/88, Dekker v. Stichting Vormingscentrum voor Jong Volwassenen (VJV-
Centrum) Plus, 1990 E.C.R. 1-394 1.
239. Id. at 1-3949.
240. See Case 32/93, Webb v. EMO Air Cargo (UK) Ltd, 1994 E.C.R. 1 -3567, 1-3587 to
-3588; see also Erika Szyszczak, The Status To Be Accorded to Motherhood: Case 32/93 Webb v. EMO
Air Cargo (UK) Ltd, 58 MOD. L. REV. 860, 864 (1995).
241. Case C-32/93, Webb, 1995 E.C.R. at 1-3587 to -3588.
242. Id.
243. See, e.g., Szyszczak, supra note 240, at 864. The Tele Danmark Court resolved this
important but narrow question, ruling that pregnant employees were protected from dismissal regardless
of whether their contract was of fixed or indefinite duration. Case C- 109/00, Tele Danmark v. Handels-
og Kontorfunktionaerenes Forbund, ex parte Brandt-Nielsen, 2001 E.C.R. 1-6993, 1-7006. However, the
Tele Danmark Court also failed to clarify whether all types of justifications for direct discrimination
based on sex would be unacceptable. As in Webb, and indeed citing Webb, the Tele Danmark Court held
that the financial loss incurred by an employer, and an employer's dependence on a woman's presence
at work cannot justify discrimination. Id. at 1-7005.
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between the ages of sixty and sixty-five. In this interval, women were eligible
for a state pension while men were not. The Commission 244 and Advocate
General Van Gerven both believed that this employer practice constituted
disparate treatment on the grounds of sex that could, however, be objectively
justified.245
Van Gerven presented two arguments in favor of allowing objective
justification arguments to be raised in disparate treatment cases. First, he
argued that "direct and indirect discrimination cannot in all cases be
distinguished from one another," 246 and that the "dividing line between direct
and indirect discrimination" was "uncertain." 247 Second, he reasoned by
analogy, listing examples whose inherent plausibility and intuitive appeal
likely justified discrimination, at least to Van Gerven and other participants at
the Birds Eye Walls ECJ hearing. These examples were "exclusion of male
candidates where an elderly lady seeks a female companion" and "the grant of
an allowance for a taxi exclusively to female employees who work at night, on
the ground that in contrast to their male counterparts they are harassed on their
way home."
248
These analogies suggest that judges' beliefs about male and female
social roles drove their willingness to allow employers to treat men and
women differently in some circumstances. It seems unlikely that the Advocate
General, or other participants in the hearing, would defer as easily to an
elderly lady's preference for a white companion, or to a company's desire to
reserve a taxi allowance to ethnic groups most worried about harassment. The
Court ended up agreeing with the Advocate General in substance, accepting
the employer's policy, and declaring that Birds Eye Walls could in fact give
different pensions to men and women. However, the ECJ's reasoning was not
clear; there was no clear statement that disparate treatment on the grounds of
sex could be justified.24 9
This issue resurfaced soon thereafter, in a related challenge to pension
plans favoring married female civil servants as compared to married males.
250
The Commission again advocated that disparate treatment could be justified as
established by analogy to the ECJ's disparate impact jurisprudence.25 1 In this
case, following the suggestion of Advocate General Jacobs, the Court side-
stepped the issue, because, unlike in Birds Eye Walls, the particular proposed
justification would not have been acceptable in any event.
While the possibility of justifying measures that harm female plaintiffs
is contested, EU law clearly allows for the justification of certain measures
that treat women more favorably than men. These are typically justified as
244. Case C-132/92, Birds Eye Walls Ltd v. Roberts, 1993 E.C.R. 1-5579, 1-5604.
245. Id. at 1-5592 to -5596 (opinion of Advocate General Van Gerven).
246. Id. at 1-5593.
247. Id. at 1-5594.
248. Id. at 1-5594 n.23.
249. Id. at 1-5605 (judgment) (holding that men at sixty were not similarly situated to women at
sixty, but rather were similarly situated to women at sixty-five).
250. Case C-7/93, Bestuur van het Algemeen Burgerlijk Pensioenfonds v. Beune, 1994 E.C.R.
1-4471.
251. Id. at 1-4492 (opinion of Advocate General Jacobs).
252. Id.
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derogations to the Equal Treatment directive; Article 2(3) allows member
states some freedom in enacting measures related to pregnancy and
maternity, 253 while Article 2(4) allows member states some freedom in
enacting measures that "promote equal opportunity" and remove existing
inequalities. 254 As other commentators have noted, the ECJ has given
expansive scope to these exceptions. Evelyn Ellis highlights that the Court's
language evolved from usage of the term "maternity," which was used in the
directive, to "motherhood., 255 Motherhood is a state of long duration; 256 it
would otherwise be difficult to invoke to justify pension policies. In contrast,
based on a paradigm that is closer to sex-neutrality than the EU paradigm,
U.S. courts would typically reject such measures as discrimination against
men.
257
2. Justifying Disparate Treatment on the Grounds ofAge and
Disability
The ECJ recently decided its first age and disability discrimination
cases. The political and economic stakes in these cases were very high:
Palacios de la Villa v. Cortefiel Servicios SA 58 and Heyday259 challenged
mandatory retirement practices prevalent across European countries, while
Mangold v. Helm 26 upset a major German labor law compromise. Coleman v.
Attridge Law 261 was the ECJ's first major disability discrimination case.
262
Coleman examined whether unfavorable treatment of a person who does not
have a disability, but cares for a disabled person, can constitute disparate
treatment on the grounds of disability.
263
Age and disability discrimination raise important policy concerns that
are specific to the elderly and the disabled. Indeed, EU legislation codifies
some of these concerns. Nevertheless, the ECJ's first age and disability
discrimination cases reveal the continuing influence of doctrinal choices made
253. Council Directive 76/207, art. 2(3), 1976 O.J. (L 39) 40, 40 (EC) ("This Directive shall be
without prejudice to provisions concerning the protection of women, particularly as regards pregnancy
and maternity").
254. Id. art. 2(4), at 40 ("This Directive shall be without prejudice to measures to promote
equal opportunity for men and women").
255. See ELLIS, supra note 68, at 287.
256. Id.
257. See, e.g., Schafer v. Bd. of Pub. Educ., 903 F.2d 243, 244 (3d Cir. 1990) (holding that an
employer's policy allowing only female employees to take childrearing leave violated male employee's
rights under Title VII).
258. Case C-411/05, Palacios de la Villa v. Cortefiel Servicios SA, 2007 E.C.R. 1-8531.
259. Case C-388/07, The Queen, ex parte Inc. Trs. of the Nat'l Council on Ageing (Age
Concern England) v. Sec'y of State for Bus., Enter. & Regulatory Reform (Heyday) (Mar. 5, 2009),
http://curia.europa.eu.
260. Case C-144/04, Mangold v. Helm, 2005 E.C.R. 1-9981.
261. Case C-303/06, Coleman v. Attridge Law (July 17, 2008), http://curia.europa.eu.
262. Chacrn Navas is the only other disability discrimination case decided by the ECJ to date.
It is a brief decision stating that sickness is not equivalent to disability and does not constitute a
protected ground on which discrimination is prohibited. See Case C-13/05, Chac6n Navas v. Eurest
Colectividades SA, 2006 E.C.R. 1-6467.
263. Case C-303/06, Coleman.
264. See Council Directive 2000/78, art. 5, 2000 O.J. (L 303) 16, 19 (EC) (outlining reasonable
accommodation for disabled persons); see also id. art. 6, at 19-20 (discussing circumstances in which
differential treatment on the grounds of age does not constitute discrimination).
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decades ago in response to particular understandings of men and women's
social roles. Sex precedents were critical to the ECJ's age discrimination
jurisprudence in two ways. On the one hand, sex precedents greatly aided the
plaintiffs; absent these precedents, it is unlikely that the ECJ would have
reached the merits of the challenges. On the other hand, sex precedents aided
the defendants: sex precedents allowed the ECJ to accept much broader
defenses than would have been possible otherwise. We observe nuanced case
law on age discrimination, not a uniformly pro-employee or a pro-employer
jurisprudence that theories of broad cultural differences might predict. The
ECJ's case law on disability is much more limited, but resembles the age
discrimination jurisprudence in key respects. On the one hand, Coleman is a
major plaintiff victory, in that the ECJ held that caretakers of disabled persons
are protected by EU law. 265 On the other, the ECJ's language in Coleman
suggests that disparate treatment on the grounds of disability can in some
cases be justified.26 6
In its first age discrimination case, Mangold, the ECJ evaluated the
legitimacy of a German labor law that protected workers under fifty-two years
of age from successive fixed-term contracts, but allowed more flexible hiring
of older workers. At the time of the alleged discrimination, the EU directive
267prohibiting age discrimination had not fully entered into force. However,
the ECJ declared that "the principle of non-discrimination on grounds of
age.., is regarded as a general principle of Community law, 26 8 thus granting
it a superior status in the sources of law hierarchy. Consequently, in a ruling
heavily criticized by legal commentators269 and leading politicians, 270 the ECJ
found that disparate treatment on the basis of age had occurred.
Elevating age discrimination to a constitutional principle was surprising,
given that neither the constitutions of most EU member states, nor
international law instruments prohibit age discrimination. 271 However, the
ECJ's puzzling decision becomes comprehensible when considered in the
context of the Court's sex discrimination jurisprudence. 272 The ECJ had
declared multiple times that "the elimination of discrimination based on sex
forms part of ... [the] fundamental rights" guaranteed by EU law.273 Thus,
265. Case C-303/06, Coleman, para. 56.
266. Id. para. 55.
267. Case C-144/04, Mangold v. Helm, 2005 E.C.R. 1-9981, 1-9983.
268. See id. at 1-9984.
269. See, e.g., Marlene Schmidt, The Principle of Non-Discrimination in Respect of Age:
Dimensions of the ECJ's Mangold Judgment, 7 GERMAN L.J. 505 (2005).
270. See, e.g., Former German President Criticizes ECJ, ILJ DIGEST, Oct. 9, 2008,
http://www.harvardilj.org/digest/archives/389.
271. More specifically, only two of twenty-seven EU states, Finland and Portugal, prohibit age
discrimination in their constitutions. CONSTITUTION OF FINLAND § 6, cl. 2; CONSTITUTION OF THE
PORTUGUESE REPUBLIC art. 59, para. 1.
272. Schmidt, supra note 269, at 518; see also Dagmar Schiek, The ECJ Decision in Mangold:
A Further Twist on Effects of Directives and Constitutional Relevance of Community Equality
Legislation, 35 INDUS. L.J. 329, 333-34 (2006).
273. See, e.g., Case C-25/02, Rinke v. Artztekammer Hamburg, 2003 E.C.R. 1-8349; Case
149/77, Defrenne v. Soci~t6 Anonyme Beige de Navigation Adrienne Sabena, 1978 E.C.R. 1365, 1378.
For a more general discussion of general principles of EU law, see PAUL CRAIG & GRAINNE DE BORCA,
EU LAW: TEXT, CASES, AND MATERIALS 876-77, 908-09 (4th ed. 2008).
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sex precedents can help explain the prohibition of age discrimination as a
general principle of EU law.
Despite the newly elevated status of the prohibition of age
discrimination and the ECJ's sympathetic stance toward the plaintiffs, the
Court declared that, in certain circumstances, age discrimination can be
justified. 274 The introduction of objective justifications for violations of
fundamental rights guaranteed by EU law should trouble equality advocates.
The availability of justifications for disparate treatment on the grounds
of age points to the direct influence of sex precedents, which leave substantial
room for the objective justification of exceptions. In spelling out the scope of
defenses to violations of general constitutional equality principles, the
Mangold Court turned to sex discrimination cases. Echoing many past sex
discrimination cases, the Mangold Court found that Germany's objective of
combating unemployment is a legitimate objective. 275 However, the ECJ held
that the German law did not meet the proportionality requirement, and cited
sex precedents for support on this point.
A closer look at the precedent the ECJ cited suggests that the
proportionality scrutiny is much less strict than would be the case under race-
neutral precedents. The Mangold Court cites Lommers to establish how
proportionality requirements will be interpreted in age-discrimination cases.277
In Lommers, the ECJ upheld a Dutch measure guaranteeing nursery places to
the children of female but not male civil service employees, as long as men
who were raising children by themselves could also benefit from the
scheme.278 The paragraph in Lommers referenced by the Mangold Court,
paragraph 39, has been interpreted in other sex discrimination cases to mean
that affirmative action measures that completely exclude males will not be
acceptable, but that measures that give at least some men access to benefits
available to all women can be acceptable.279 The Lommers Court is explicit
that it aims to reduce de facto, rather than de jure inequality, and recognizes
that in so doing it might "perpetuate a traditional division of gender roles."
280
Lommers is thus a sex-conscious precedent, and it is this sex-conscious
precedent that is exported to define the scope of exceptions to age
274. Apparently, EU general equality principles require that "'comparable situations must not
be treated differently and different situations must not be treated in the same way unless such treatment
is objectively justified' by the pursuit of a legitimate aim and provided that it 'is appropriate and
necessary in order to achieve' that aim." Case C-144/04, Mangold v. Helm, 2005 E.C.R. 1-9981,
1-10002 to -10003 (opinion of Advocate General Tizzano); see also id. at 1-10036 to -10040 (judgment).
275. See id. at 1-10036. Sex precedents calling this a legitimate objective include Case C-77/02,
Steinicke v. Bundesanstalt ffir Arbeit, 2003 E.C.R. 1-9027.
276. See Schiek, supra note 272, at 332.
277. See Case C-144/04, Mangold, 2005 E.C.R. at 1-10037 to -10038 (citing Case C-476/99,
Lommers v. Minister van Landbouw, Natuurbeheer en Visserij, 2002 E.C.R. 1-2891).
278. See Case C-476/99, Lommers, 2002 E.C.R. at 1-2937 to -2938.
279. See, e.g., Case C-319/03, Briheche v. Ministre de 'lntrrieur, 2004 E.C.R. 1-8807, 1-8817
to -8818 (opinion of Advocate General Maduro) ("Both in Badeck and Lommers, the Court gave specific
consideration to the fact that the measures in question did not amount to a total exclusion of male
candidates. The Court held that, in order to be compatible with Article 2(4) of Directive 76/207, a
measure should meet this negative condition. In fact, in Lommers the Court expressly noted that the
measure at issue did not totally exclude male officials from its scope. Otherwise, the positive measure
could not be reconciled with the equal treatment principle." (footnotes omitted)).
280. See Case C-476/99, Lommers, 2002 E.C.R. at 1-2937.
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discrimination. It seems likely that a race-neutral precedent would only allow
for much narrower exceptions, or not allow for exceptions at all.
The next two age discrimination cases, Palacios and Heyday, confirmed
that broad exemptions would be permissible in EU age discrimination law by
highlighting that broad mandatory retirement provisions can be justified. U.S.
age discrimination law prohibits mandatory retirement clauses for almost all
occupations. In Palacios, the ECJ held that Spain's mandatory retirement laws
constituted disparate treatment on the grounds of age but that were justified by
public policy rationales involving employment promotion. 28 In Heyday, the
ECJ held that Britain's mandatory retirement laws might also be justifiable.
282
The first step in the Palacios inquiry was whether the ECJ could review
mandatory retirement clauses in collective agreements. Advocate General
Mazdk argued that this question should be answered in the negative on policy
grounds and in order to faithfully interpret the legislative text's age
discrimination provisions; however, he conceded that sex precedents pointed
in the opposite direction. 283 In contrast, the ECJ followed sex precedents and
claimed jurisdiction to review mandatory retirement policies, despite a recital
in the Framework Directive indicating that member states would likely have
preferred a contrary outcome. 284 The recital in question stated, "[t]his
Directive shall be without prejudice to national provisions laying down
retirement ages.,
285
The ECJ then decided that mandatory retirement amounted to disparate
treatment on the basis of age, and went on to examine whether it could be
justified.28 6 Following sex precedents, the ECJ ruled that the objective pursued
by mandatory retirement legislation was legitimate. "[T]he Court has already
held that encouragement of recruitment undoubtedly constitutes a legitimate
aim of social policy." 287 The Court then examined "whether . . . the means
employed to achieve such a legitimate aim are 'appropriate and necessary.'
288
Citing to the prior age discrimination case, Mangold, which in tum cited to a
281. Case C-411/05, Palacios de la Villa v. Cortefiel Servicios SA, 2007 E.C.R. 1-8531, 1-8548
to -8550.
282. Case C-388/07, The Queen, ex parte Inc. Trs. of the Nat'l Council on Ageing (Age
Concern England) v. Sec'y of State for Bus., Enter. & Regulatory Reform (Heyday), para. 52 (Mar. 5,
2009), http://curia.europa.eu.
283. See Case C-411/05, Palacios de la Villa v. Cortefiel Servicios SA, 2007 E.C.R. 1-8531,
1-8547 (opinion of Advocate General MazAk) ("To regard [mandatory retirement] instead as 'dismissal'
is in my view rather far-fetched, although, admittedly, the Court espoused an interpretation to that effect
in its case-law on that term as used in Article 5(1) of Council Directive 76/207/EEC of 9 February 1976
on the implementation of the principle of equal treatment for men and women as regards access to
employment, vocational training and promotion, and working conditions.").
284. See id. at 1-8585 to -8587 (judgment).
285. See Council Directive 2000/78, recital 14, 2000 O.J. (L 303) 16, 17 (EC).
286. See Case C-411/05, Palacios, 2007 E.C.R at 1-8588.
287. Id. at 1-8591. To support this claim, the ECJ cited to paragraph 39 in Case C-208/05, ITC
Innovative Tech. Ctr. GmbH v. Bundesagentur fUr Arbeit, 2007 E.C.R. 1-181, 1-227 a freedom-of-
movement case. In turn, this paragraph cited to similar objective justifications brought forth in two
indirect sex discrimination cases: Case C- 167/97, The Queen v. Sec'y of State for Employment, ex parte
Seymour-Smith, 1999 E.C.R. 1-623, 1-685 to -686; and Case C-77/02, Steinicke v. Bundesanstalt fir
Arbeit, 2003 E.C.R. 1-9027, 1-9064 to -9065.
288. Case C-411/05, Palacios. 2007 E.C.R. at 1-8592.
2010]
THE YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 35:115
sex discrimination case, Lommers, 289 the Court held that the mandatory
retirement provision at issue could be objectively justified.290
In light of the Palacios and Mangold holdings, a central part of the next
age discrimination case, the Heyday challenge, involved the claim made in
this Subsection: that the ECJ improperly exports broad defenses available in
disparate impact sex cases to disparate treatment claims. The referring court
asked whether there exists a significant practical difference between the test
for justification in relation to disparate impact, and the test for justification in
relation to disparate treatment on the basis of age. 291 The plaintiff, British
charity Age Concern, argued that the ECJ should use a stricter test for the
justification of age disparate treatment than for sex disparate impact.292
However, the member states represented at the hearing,
293 the Commission,294
and the Advocate General all concluded that a less strict standard for
justification should be possible, allowing for the justification of the mandatory
retirement provision at issue.295 Advocate Mazdk's recommendation to the
ECJ was that the Court not specify the relationship between justification under
disparate impact and treatment claims, but instead declare that the mandatory
retirement provisions can in principle be justified.296 The ECJ followed this
view.297 To specify the scope of the exception, the ECJ again turned to sex
discrimination doctrine developed in the disparate impact context.
298
The ECJ's doctrine on disability is not yet well developed. But concerns
that the ECJ is exporting broad exceptions from disparate impact sex
discrimination doctrine into disparate treatment disability discrimination
doctrine have already emerged. More specifically, in Coleman v. Attridge
Law, 299 the ECJ's first major disability discrimination case, the ECJ
introduced the possibility that disparate treatment on the basis of disability
could be justified. Ms. Coleman suffered no disability herself, but cared for a
disabled child. She alleged that her employer treated her less favorably than
caretakers of non-disabled children. The ECJ held that discrimination against
caretakers of disabled persons was disparate treatment on the grounds of
disability. In this sense, the ECJ expanded the concept of disparate treatment
to include discrimination by association. U.S. statutes also prohibit
discrimination against the caretakers of the disabled; it is unclear whether, in
the absence of such a statute, U.S. courts would have extended protections
covering the disabled to their caretakers.
289. See Case C-144/04, Mangold v. Helm, 2005 E.C.R. 1-9981, 1-10037.
290. Id. at 1- 10090.
291. See Case C-388/07, The Queen, ex parte Inc. Trs. of the Nat'l Council on Ageing (Age
Concern England) v. Sec'y of State for Bus., Enter. & Regulatory Reform (Heyday), para. 20 (Mar. 5,
2009), http://curia.europa.eu ("Is there any, and if so what, significant practical difference between the
test for justification set out in Article 2(2) of the directive in relation to indirect discrimination, and the
test for justification set out in relation to direct age discrimination at Article 6(1) of the directive?").
292. See id. paras. 29-34 (report for hearing).
293. See id. paras. 35-41.
294. See id. paras. 42-49.
295. See id. paras. 79-88 (opinion of Advocate General MazAk).
296. See id. para. 88.
297. See id. paras. 51-52 (judgment).
298. See id. para. 51 (drawing an analogy to Case C-167/97, The Queen v. Sec'y of State for
Employment, exparte Seymour-Smith, 1999 E.C.R. 1-623).
299. Case C-303/06, Coleman v. Attridge Law (July 17, 2008), http://curia.europa.eu.
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In addition to expanding the scope of a disability discrimination prima
facie case, the ECJ also introduced the possibility that disparate treatment on
the grounds of disability can be justified. In explaining what employers must
do following a prima facie case, the ECJ specified that: "[T]he respondents
could contest the existence of such a breach [of the equal treatment principle]
by establishing by any legally permissible means, in particular, that the
employee's treatment was justified by objective factors unrelated to any
discrimination on grounds of disability and to any association which that
employee has with a disabled person." 300 This language of objective
justification comes directly from sex disparate impact cases and includes a
broad set of defenses. 30 1 Because EU disability law is very new, the scope of
available defenses remains unclear. However, sex discrimination precedents
should give advocates for the disabled reason for concern.
V. CONCLUSION
This Article illustrates how the sequence in which courts adjudicate
claims can influence the doctrines they develop. U.S. and EU courts faced
very similar questions in developing early employment discrimination
doctrine. Race-blindness shaped the answers that U.S. courts offered, while
sex-consciousness guided EU courts. Courts extended doctrines developed in
these early cases to claims brought by other groups by using analogical
reasoning and by interpreting the same words in the same way in different
contexts. Interpretation processes that reinforce and expand on early decisions
are rarely interrupted, because judicial decisionmaking is often insulated from
political pressures. Disability, age, and sexual orientation claims today
succeed or fail depending on accidents of historical sequencing.
According chance a central role in the development of the law can be
deeply problematic. In economic markets, path-dependent processes often
cause inefficiencies; for example, outdated technologies remain in widespread
use long after better models are developed. Similarly, when chance plays a
large role in the process by which laws are generated, societies are unlikely to
get optimal laws-laws that are efficient, fair or culturally appropriate. More
fundamentally, however, non-arbitrariness is essential to the rule of law itself.
Law can impose severe penalties, or fail to redress major harms; in either
case, it should embody and articulate society's moral reasons for influencing
individuals' well-being.
30 2
Different claimants bear the burden of this arbitrariness in the United
States and the European Union. In the European Union, plaintiffs who make
claims courts consider typical of their group gain greater protections than in
the United States, as a consequence of early sex-conscious precedents.
Because of race-blindness norms, U.S. law protects atypical claimants more.
300. See Case C-303/06, Coleman, para. 55.
301. See, e.g., Case C-25/02, Rinke v. Hamburg, 2003 E.C.R. 1-8349, 1-8384 ("According to
settled case-law, a provision involves indirect discrimination against female workers when, although
worded in neutral terms, it works to the disadvantage of a much higher percentage of women than men,
unless that difference in treatment is justified by objective factors unrelated to any discrimination on
grounds of sex .... ).
302. See Jeremy Waldron, Lucky in Your Judge, 9 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 185, 191 (2008).
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Some illustrations clarify this point. Women who want to work in professions
where many other women work gain greater protections under EU law. The
ECJ recognizes comparable worth claims, and allows women to sue to
increase their pay and match the salaries of similarly skilled men. 30 3 In
contrast, comparable worth claims systematically fail in the United States.
30 4
However, women who want to work in fields dominated by men fare
better under U.S. law. For example, U.S. courts often mandate that prisons
adjust workplace conditions to accommodate female guards.30 5 In contrast, the
ECJ allows for the prisons to categorically exclude women from guard jobs-
even from administrative posts that involve no contact with inmates. 306
Similarly, the ECJ has upheld broad defenses for police forces operating in
dangerous situations, accepting that female police reservists in Northern
Ireland could be refused firearms training and face contract non-renewal.3 7
Once women are excluded wholesale from certain fields, it is less surprising
for wholesale exclusions of other minorities to follow. Thus, for example,
religious quotas in the Northern Ireland police force do not violate EU
discrimination law. 30 8 More generally, employers in the European Union can
argue that a particular racial background is an occupational qualification; U.S.
law prohibits this.
30 9
While women interested in reconciling work and family benefit from EU
antidiscrimination law, men with similar interests are better protected by U.S.
law. For example, the ECJ has upheld measures restricting childrearing leave
to biological 31 or adoptive female parents,311 and the reservation of nursery
places for the children of all female employees and only certain male
parents. 312 In contrast, U.S. courts typically reject such measures as
discrimination against men.
3 13
Age discrimination cases show similar patterns. In the United States, the
typical age discrimination lawsuit involves a fifty-five-year-old white man
who works in a professional field and wants to keep the high pay and good
303. Case C-127/92, Enderby v. Frenchay Health Auth., 1993 E.C.R. 1-5535.
304. See MICHAEL W. MCCANN, RIGHTS AT WORK: PAY EQUITY REFORM AND THE POLITICS OF
LEGAL MOBILIZATION 48-91 (1994).
305. See, e.g., Hardin v. Synchcomb, 691 F.2d 1364 (11th Cir. 1982) (rejecting the BFOQ
requirement in the prison context); Forts v. Ward, 621 F.2d 1210, 1217 (2d Cir. 1980) (same); Gunther
v. Iowa State Men's Reformatory, 612 F.2d 1079 (8th Cir. 1980) (same); Harden v. Dayton Human
Rehab. Ctr., 520 F. Supp. 769 (D.C. Ohio 1981) (same), aff'd, 779 F.2d 50 (6th Cir. 1985).
306. See Case 318/86, Comm'n v. France, 1988 E.C.R. 1-3559, 1-3578 to -3579 (holding that
both warden and managerial head warden positions could be reserved to men, despite the finding that
prison jobs could be structured differently).
307. See Case C-273/97, Sirdar v Army Bd., 1999 E.C.R. 1-7403.
308. See Council Directive 2000/78, art. 15, 2000 O.J. (L 303) 16, 21 (EC).
309. See Council Directive 2000/43, art. 4, 2000 O.J. (L 180) 22, 24 (EC).
310. See Case 184/83, Hofmann v. Barmer Ersatzkasse, 1984 E.C.R. 3047.
311. See Case 163/82, Comm'n v. Italy, 1983 E.C.R. 3273.
312. See Case C-476/99, Lommers v. Minister van Landbouw, Natuurbeheer en Visserij, 2002
E.C.R. 1-2891; see also Case C-366/99, Griesmar v. Ministre de l'Economie, 2001 E.C.R. 1-9383
(suggesting that member states may allow pension credits to accrue to all mothers but only to fathers
who could prove they were involved in the raising of children).
313. See, e.g., Schafer v. Bd. of Pub. Educ., 903 F.2d 243, 248 (3d Cir. 1990) (holding that
making childrearing leave available to all females, but only to males who could show they were
disabled, violates Title VII).
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benefits that come with seniority. 314 U.S. courts are not particularly
sympathetic to these claims. Most recently, in Smith v. City of Jackson, the
Supreme Court upheld an employer's policy of giving proportionately larger
raises to younger employees. 315 Empirical studies show lower courts to be
similarly unsympathetic. 16 Early EU cases suggest that the ECJ will treat
these "typical" older workers more favorably. In Mangold, the ECJ held that
employers could not offer contracts with worse benefit terms to older
workers. 317 The ECJ has also departed from the U.S. jurisprudence by
declaring nondiscrimination on the basis of age to be a fundamental principle
of EU constitutional law.
318
The tables turn when we look at older workers whom the ECJ considers
atypical-sixty-five-year-old workers who seek to work past conventional
retirement ages. These atypical workers can face dismissal in Europe,
because, as discussed above, the ECJ has upheld broad mandatory retirement
policies. In the United States, with few exceptions, these workers can keep
their jobs, because mandatory retirement policies are illegal.3 19 Accidents in
historical sequencing turn out to have significant and surprising consequences.
314. See George Rutherglen, From Race to Age: The Expanding Scope of Employment
Discrimination Law, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 491, 492-94, 515 (1995) (providing a statistical breakdown of
plaintiffand claim characteristics under the ADEA).
315. 544 U.S. 228, 241-43 (2005).
316. See Selmi, supra note 69, at 748 (stating that, in a large statistical sample, the author did
not find a single disparate impact age discrimination law suit that was successful on the merits).
317. See Case C-144/04, Mangold v. Helm, 2005 E.C.R. 1-9981.
318. Compare Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312-14 (1976) (finding that age
discrimination does not trigger heightened scrutiny under the U.S. Constitution), with Case C-144/04,
Mangold, 2005 E.C.R. at 1-10040 (finding that the principle of nondiscrimination based on age is a
general principle of EU constitutional law).
319. See Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (2006).
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